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Thesis summary 
 
Although water is a renewable resource, the growing water scarcity and water stress relative to human 
demands is now evident in many parts of the world, particularly in developing countries (Postel 1993; 
Postel 2000). In these countries, clean water and sanitation services are still severely lacking and this 
results in a multitude of people suffering from preventable illnesses from which many die each year 
(Montgomery and Elimelech 2007). In fact, many millions of people in developing countries use an 
unreliable water supply of poor quality, given that the majority lack piped connections to their 
premises (Howard and Bartram 2005). The problem is that current policies exclude many from the 
supply network and the unconnected tend to be the poorest. In addition to the high costs per unit to 
purchase non-piped water, households without a connection to the piped network spend an undue 
amount of time walking to the nearest source of water such as a private or public tap, wells, or water 
vended from trucks (Van den Berg and Nauges 2012). Furthermore, even though households who are 
connected to the piped network are assumed to have access to an improved water supply system, the 
fact is that water quality is still a general problem for all, given that many existing systems only 
operate intermittently. This results in service interruptions, which in turn lead to water stagnancy and 
the growth of microorganisms (Lee and Schwab 2005). During such interruptions, it is understandable 
that households connected to the piped network also rely on water from alternative, non-tap sources. 
 
The main cause of service discontinuities by utilities in developing countries is the lack of a water 
tariff scheme that enables the cost of supply to be recovered. Full-cost-recovery pricing for all water 
would exclude the poorest, however; for this reason, many utilities subsidise at least part of their water 
delivery through low tariffs. Nonetheless, these low tariffs usually lead to losses to the utility and are 
often poorly targeted. These implicit subsidies, which frequently operate through so-called Increasing 
Block Tariff schemes, have also been judged to be regressive and badly targeted in the sense that they 
are not good redistribution tools, they do not reach the poorest households, and they cannot reach 
households that are not connected to the piped network (UN 2007). Since the implicit subsidies reduce 
the revenue for utilities, they also mean that, without government subsidies, the utilities frequently 
lack the funds to maintain the piped networks – let alone expand them. 
 
Thus, there are issues with managing supply, i.e. how to set tariffs so that utilities can afford to 
maintain and invest in infrastructure; but there are also the questions of how to manage demand, and 
how to allocate water among different, competing uses. 
 
In fact, competition for limited water resources is increasing among a variety of stakeholders. 
Generally, agriculture, as a sector, consumed the most water (80% or more of total withdrawals in 
developing countries). Therefore, the issues revolve around the value generated by water in this sector, 
and whether such water could be put to better use elsewhere (Falkenmark 1990). In developing 
countries, the agricultural sector accounts for large fractions of employment and constitutes the 
primary source of livelihoods, but it is also characterised by low-value subsistence production. In 
addition, due to the low productivity registered in this sector, irrigation has been seen as a way to 
enable smallholders to adopt more diversified cropping patterns and to switch to high-value market-
oriented production (Intizar and Munir 2004). Thus, given that irrigation accounts for around 70% of 
water withdrawals worldwide and over 80% in low-income developing countries, better water access 
is likely to result in improved outcomes for farmers (Meinzen et al. 2001). However, given that overall 
water availability is constrained, allocating even more water to agriculture is not necessarily the best 
choice. Both the water itself and the infrastructure needed to supply it has potential alternative uses, 
such as improved access to water for households, industrial uses or environmental uses, and the 
benefits generated in agriculture need to be compared with the benefits that the water could have 
generated elsewhere. 
 
Given the current water scarcity and competition between uses and users, any successful policy for 
improved water management is likely to be context-dependent. In fact, water resource management 
takes place in a complex socio-economic context; thus, the successful implementation of water reform 
requires all stakeholders – and especially end-users – to participate as fully as possible in development 
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planning and management in the decision-making process (UNDP 2008). In fact, it has been observed 
that when local communities, which are better placed to manage their environment and resources, are 
given the responsibility of water resource management, it tends to be more effective (Oosterveer and 
Van Vliet 2010). However, how well this works will depend not only on the local community spirit, 
but also on whether or not there are clearly defined groups of water users managing the water. 
 
The present study aims to contribute to the analysis of water scarcity and management in developing 
countries, with Rwanda as a case study. 
 
The thesis consists of five papers related to each other. 
 
The first paper, entitled “Water demand by unconnected households in urban districts of Rwanda”, 
analyses the demand by households in urban districts of Rwanda who lack piped connections to their 
premises and who rely on existing non-tap sources. It is shown that non-tap water not only occasions 
extra costs compared with tap water, but also exposes users to the higher risk of water-borne diseases. 
In the analysis, we consider that the household’s decision to purchase water from a chosen source 
might depend on the price of that source as well as on the attributes of the other existing sources – 
whether chosen or not. Furthermore, we considered the fact that the time spent by households 
collecting water has an opportunity cost since that time could be used to generate income if the 
household was connected to tap water. Thus, the household’s full income (i.e. the full value of the 
household’s time) and the full cost of different water sources (i.e. the cost including the value of the 
time used to fetch the water) were important points in the analysis. The findings suggest that income 
elasticities are higher when the household’s full income is considered rather than only its monetary 
income, and the full cost associated with alternative water sources is an important determinant of the 
choice of source. Furthermore, although unconnected households combine different sources of water, 
the majority uses only one source – the public tap. Extending the existing tap connection should be 
advantageous to these unconnected households. However, if one considers the current lower income 
registered by that group, an appropriate solution in the short run could be to improve the non-tap 
distribution systems in a way that the majority could still afford. 
 
The second paper, “Individual status quo modelling for a rural water service in Rwanda: Application 
of a choice experiment”, addresses the supply of water for domestic and irrigation purposes in rural 
areas of Rwanda. For domestic purposes, many rural households collect water from unsafe sources; 
this often exposes them to worms, dysentery, cholera, etc. However, referring to the existing 
individual levels of some attributes of existing non-tap sources, such as the unit price of water, the 
distance to the nearest water point, and the frequency of contracting a water-borne disease, there is 
evidence of a wide variation in baseline status. The same situation applies to the uneven distribution of 
irrigation water through different parts of the country, and can be observed through the amount of 
irrigation water available during the dry season, the frequency of irrigation events, the price paid by 
farmers for such water, and the degree of famers’ current involvement in irrigation water management. 
In respect of both types of supply, i.e. domestic and irrigation, we considered that these heterogeneous 
baseline conditions might lead to variations in individuals’ preference for an improved service. The 
results from our experiment show that using existing information on individuals helped to improve the 
model fit, and led to higher estimates of the overall willingness to pay for improved services. 
However, it also allowed us to identify who actually wanted changes in the supply service and why. 
From a policy perspective, therefore, not accounting for the individual’s existing situation could be 
misleading: one might end up either with projects that are implemented but do not respond to real 
individual needs, or with policies that generate an overall improvement, but which worsen conditions 
for those with a favourable status quo. 
 
The third paper, titled “Social cohesion in Rwanda: Results from a public good experiment”, records 
our study of how differences in prosocial behaviour can affect the provision of local public amenities, 
such as water, in Rwanda. Given Rwanda’s turbulent history, culminating in the 1994 genocide and 
the remaining tensions, the quality and extent of cooperation among members of local communities in 
practice could potentially have implications for the success of Rwanda’s public service. With a 
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traditional public good experiment, the results showed clear variation in the level of contribution to the 
public good when it came to respondents from different backgrounds. The research evidence may have 
implications for Rwanda’s current decentralisation policies. In fact, the success of these policies will 
mainly depend on whether and to what extent local communities feel a sense of responsibility for 
maintaining the public amenities that have been decentralised to them. However, people might not act 
for the well-being of the group, given their personal histories. In such a case, the government should 
consider promoting their decentralisation policies along with initiatives to improve social cohesion 
among the various groups in Rwanda. 
 
The fourth paper, namely “The value of access to water: Livestock farming in the Nyagatare District, 
Rwanda” (resubmitted to Regional Environmental Change), deals with the effect of access to an 
improved water supply on the revenue generated in livestock farming. Such effect is determined by 
assessing the current priorities in water policies in Rwanda, specifically in the Nyagatare District. We 
found that reducing the walking distance for cattle to the nearest water point – i.e. one of the channels 
through which productivity might improve – did not in fact ensure an overall positive impact. Thus, if 
one considers that existing funds are targeted more towards improving water infrastructure for 
livestock, it is worth examining the extent to which improved access to water actually contributes 
positively to the livestock industry. The existing situation shows that many households in the district 
still lack access to safe water, and rely on non-tap water. This scarcity in domestic water use is mainly 
caused by the existing, generally poor state of water supply infrastructure in the entire country, and by 
the fact that some of the water supply points used to water livestock could also be used as sources of 
drinking water. In view of our findings not showing clear evidence on the net benefit for all farmers 
due to an increased number of water points, the high priority given to extending the water network for 
the purposes of increasing livestock productivity should be revisited. 
 
The fifth paper, “Water management and pricing in the urban areas of Rwanda: The case of Kigali 
city”, published in Water Utility Management International 7(3):13–17, concerns water management 
and pricing in the urban areas of Rwanda, using the capital city, Kigali, as a case study. In the capital, 
where the majority of the country’s urban residents live, access to municipal water constitutes a 
critical issue. Even for the low proportion of households currently connected to the piped network, 
water provision is uncertain due to regular interruptions. The residents who are not connected to the 
piped network at all face higher average costs for their water and are generally even poorer than 
connected residents.  In fact, these issues are likely to be related to the imperfections in the pricing 
mechanism in water supply. The problems are twofold: on the one hand, the current Increasing Block 
Tariff structure signifies that connected consumers pay low marginal tariffs that cannot generate 
revenues to cover both operating and long-term investments costs; and on the other, the poorest cannot 
afford the high one-off fee to be connected to the network, and prefer, due to liquidity constraints, to 
deflect their consumption to the alternative water sources – although these are much more expensive in 
the long run. Thus, to deal with this problem, better pricing instruments need to be settled so that the 
utility can finance capital costs for infrastructure and allow the poorest, who currently pay more on 
unsafe non-tap water, to connect to the water network in the first place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
References 
 
Falkenmark M (1990) Rapid population growth and water scarcity: The predicament of tomorrow’s 
Africa. Population and Development Review 16:81–94 
Howard G, Bartram J (2005) Effective water supply surveillance in urban areas of developing 
countries. Water Health 3:31–43 
Intizar H, Munir A (2004) Irrigation and poverty alleviation: Review of the empirical evidence. 
Irrigation and Drainage 53:1–15 
Lee EJ, Schwab KJ (2005) Deficiencies in drinking water distribution systems in developing 
countries. J. Water Health 3:109–127 
Meinzen D, Suseela R, Rosegrant MW (eds) (2001) Overcoming water scarcity and quality 
constraints. IFPRI, Washington, D.C, pp 1–29 
Montgomery MA, Elimelech M (2007) Water and sanitation in developing countries: Including health 
in the equation. Environmental Science and Technology 41:17–24 
Oosterveer P, Van Vliet B (2010) Environmental systems and local actors: Decentralizing 
environmental policy in Uganda. Environmental Management 45:284–295 
Postel S (1993) Facing water scarcity. Brown L (ed) The state of the world. WW Norton, New York, 
pp 22–41 
Postel S (2000) Entering an era of water scarcity: The challenges ahead. Ecological Applications 
10(4):941–948 
UN/United Nations (2007) Providing water to the urban poor in developing countries: The role of 
tariffs and subsidies. Sustainable Development Innovation Briefs 4:1–8 
UNDP/United Nations Development Programme (2008). Decentralization of Water Decision Making 
Issue Series; 1. Water Governance Facility, SIWI- Stockholm 
Van den Berg C, Nauges C (2012) The willingness to pay for access to piped water: A hedonic 
analysis of house prices in Southwest Sri Lanka. Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences 
5:151–166 
Paper I

 Water demand by unconnected households in urban districts of Rwanda 
 
Claudine Uwera 
Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, PO Box 640, 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden 
(Tel) +46 (0)31 786 2635 ;( Fax) +46 (0)31 786 1326 
E-mail: Claudine.Uwera@economics.gu.se 
Department of Economics, National University of Rwanda, PO Box 56, Butare, Rwanda 
E-mail: cuwera@nur.ac.rw 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we analyse water demand by households in urban districts in Rwanda who currently 
lack a piped connection into their home. The analysis uses data from a cross-sectional survey. The 
demand function has been estimated in a two-step procedure for correcting selection bias (Heckman 
1979). The results showed that public taps are the most widely used water source and that the demand 
from this source is more inelastic compared with that for other water sources. Although it happens 
that households combine different sources of water, the majority in the sample uses only one source. 
We use the full household income, and obtain results which indicate income elasticities higher than 
those obtained with monetary income. The full cost associated with alternative water sources is shown 
to be important for determining the choice of source – something which has been overlooked in most 
previous studies. Poor (unconnected) households cannot expect to be connected to the piped network 
in the short run; and improving the current non-tap distribution systems could be considered an 
alternative solution.  
  
Keywords: coping sources of water, full income, unconnected households, unselected sources, water 
demand elasticity, urban districts, Rwanda 
 
JEL Classification: L95, Q21, Q25, R22 
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 1. Introduction 
 
This paper presents a study on water use by Rwandan households in urban areas who are not 
connected to the piped municipal network. The research reported here extends previous research by 
using a more complete description of the decision problem facing these households. A household’s 
decision about what water source to use and how much water to use is likely to be affected both by 
the characteristics of all available water sources – a fact which many previous studies have neglected 
– and by the full range of consumption options available to the household in question. 
 
More specifically, the paper aims to investigate how unconnected households’ simultaneous decision 
to use a particular source among others and a specified quantity of water from that particular source is 
affected by the total costs (the price of water and the value of the time) of the selected and unselected 
sources, the full household income, and other socio-economic variables. In this study, households 
generally rely on the public tap, protected springs, unprotected springs or on somebody else’s private 
tap sources. 
 
Access to clean tap water within the residence is far from universal in developing countries (Nauges 
and Strand 2007). In many of these countries, water is collected from communal sources which may 
or may not be safe (Gundry et al. 2004). Water-related diseases due to microbial contamination during 
and after collection continue to be a major health problem in such countries (Wright et al. 2004). In 
sub-Saharan African cities, only 35% of the urban population has piped water in the dwelling, plot or 
yard (Dos Santos and LeGrand 2012). 
 
A similar situation exists in the urban areas of Rwanda dealt with in this study. The paper is about 
urban water use in Rwanda in general and, in particular, about water demand by households that are 
not connected to the piped network. In general, these households who lack piped connections spend a 
considerable amount of time collecting potentially unsafe water. This time could instead have been 
used to generate an income if water were available on the premises; so this time use has a 
considerable opportunity cost for the households in question. Thus, the time needed to reach a water 
source is likely to be an important factor in determining what water source households use. In their 
choice, households might also be influenced not only by the attributes of the chosen source, but also 
by those of the ones not selected.  
 
The existing literature (as discussed in e.g. Nauges and Whittington 2010) largely ignores the 
characteristics of the water sources not chosen or used that might affect the choice model, but that 
element is considered in the present study. Thus, we consider the attributes of these unchosen sources 
in our model. Therefore, the demand for all kinds of water available to unconnected households is 
taken into consideration, whether or not they use a particular source. We found that households were 
less sensitive to changes in the cost of water from public taps, i.e. the main water source, than they 
were to changes in the cost of water from springs or from somebody else’s private tap.  
 
The Full income variable (the full value of an individual’s time, given that individual’s hourly wage, 
i.e. what an individual would make if s/he worked all the time) is used here instead of Monetary 
income (Becker 1965). As far as we know, the Monetary income variable rather than its Full income 
counterpart has been applied to all previous water demand models. In the present study, reference is 
made to the full value of a person’s time; if monetary income only had been used, the value of the 
time used would have been ignored. Compared with when only Monetary income is considered, we 
find a higher income elasticity of demand for Full income. 
 
From a policy perspective, the welfare impact of having access to one’s own piped water is potentially 
huge. Also, extending the current tap-water systems so that more unconnected households have access 
to their own piped water instead of the sources people use now might be of great importance in terms 
of saving the money normally forgone by the time used to collect water. However, this extension 
requires large investments, whose benefit needs to be informed. 
2
  
Given that the majority of unconnected households are poor and may not be able to pay the cost of 
these investments, improving the current non-tap distribution systems to improve poor households’ 
access to safe and adequate water could be considered an alternative solution to that of extending the 
current tap-water system. However, detailed knowledge of currently unconnected households’ water 
demand and their socio-economic characteristics might help the water utility and policymakers in the 
water sector enhance such households’ access to a reliable water supply. 
 
In Section 2, a short description is given of the current water situation in Rwanda, as a background. In 
Section 3, earlier water demand studies done in developing countries are briefly discussed. Section 4 
describes basic data on the average types of coping sources
1
 faced by unconnected households. 
According to the results, this group relies on a multitude of sources. However, in all districts, many 
unconnected households use public taps as their main coping source. Furthermore, unconnected 
households face higher prices and lower water consumption levels, compared with connected 
households. Also, water from coping sources needs to be carried to the dwelling; the results show that, 
in general. unconnected households spent more time on this activity, implying higher time costs for 
them. In Section 5, a water demand function is estimated by means of a two-step procedure for 
correcting selection bias and we present the results of the empirical estimations in Section 6. These 
results are discussed further in the conclusion. 
 
2. Background 
 
In developing countries, factors leading to water supply problems are numerous, complex, 
interrelated, and sometimes influenced by political decisions, instability, poverty, and civil war. The 
high rate of population growth, a lack of investment in water supply infrastructure, and limitations to 
natural water resources are the main reasons why water supply systems in large cities in these 
countries fail (Bruggen et al. 2010; Carter et al. 1999). Because of the lack of funds for extending the 
water supply infrastructure, many water utilities charge high fees for connecting new plots to the 
network. However, these fees, which need to be paid before the connection is installed, exclude the 
poor in particular from being connected to the network, and cause them to prefer sourcing their water 
from elsewhere – at a higher overall cost, but with less upfront payment than the piped water. 
Therefore, many households in developing countries lack in-house piped connections and lack access 
to safe drinking water (Ademiluyi and Odugbesan 2008). These unconnected households then rely on 
several types of unsafe non-tap water sources, such as public or private wells, public or (someone 
else’s) private taps, tank trucks, rainwater collection, or water from rivers, streams or lakes (Nauges 
and Whittington 2010). This unreliable water exacts a high toll in health and coping costs. Regarding 
health costs, it has been noted (Wright et al. 2004) that low-quality water leads to poor health. About 
1.8 million people – the majority of whom live in developing countries and are children under five 
years of age – die every year due to waterborne diseases like cholera (Toutouom and Sikod 2012). 
Thus, both the public sector health system and the household itself incur a variety of health costs, e.g. 
money spent on medicines, the medical practitioners’ time treating illnesses, and lost earnings due to 
inability to work. The coping costs associated with non-tap water provision are those related to the 
amount of time and effort walking to water sources, and money to purchase water. To remedy this 
situation, changes in the forms of service and payment mechanisms for an improved water supply 
have been discussed, but, as Whittington et al. (2008) caution, the outcome of any intervention is 
likely to be context-dependent: an intervention that works well in one locality may fail miserably in 
another. 
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 According to Pattanayak et al. (2005), a coping source refers to all alternative supply and storage 
facilities adopted by households in response to deficiencies in the piped water supply system. Coping 
strategies include collecting water from different non-tap sources, purchasing water from vendors and 
neighbours, investing in storage tanks and filtration systems, and boiling water before drinking or 
cooking with it. 
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 The water supply situation for developing countries described above applies to Rwanda as well. 
Rwanda remains a water-scarce country. The management of water in Rwanda has been a great 
challenge, despite the efforts made by the government in setting up strategic policies and regulations. 
The major issues in domestic water supply in Rwanda are mainly the increasing demand, pollution of 
water sources, and poor reliability of water supply systems. Projections show that nearly half a million 
additional people would need to be connected to adequate drinking water every year until 2015 in 
order to meet the country’s Millennium Development Goals (World Bank 2012). Then, considering 
the current 2.75% population growth rate, rapid urbanisation and large-scale housing developments, 
projections show that, if the recommended minimum per capita consumption standard of 20 litres per 
person per day is respected, 73 million m
3
 per year would be needed. However, the current daily per 
capita consumption is still very low – in the order of 6 to 8 litres (Republic of Rwanda 2011). This 
means that domestic water consumption would still be in the region of 29.2 million m
3
. In brief, the 
availability of safe drinking water does not meet the population’s needs, and distribution of what there 
is remains inadequate. 
 
In Rwanda, public water supply is divided into two subsectors: the urban water supply system, and its 
rural counterpart. Kigali city and all other urban centres are supplied by the state-owned public utility, 
the Energy, Water and Sanitation Authority (EWSA). EWSA also manages all urban water services 
(Republic of Rwanda 2006). The rural areas are supplied by natural springs and some other projects 
by regional water utilities, but EWSA remains ultimately  responsible for constructing new rural water 
supply infrastructure (Klooster et al. 2011). 
 
Statistics show that around 32% of Rwanda’s population have access to the piped network, but that 
only 3.4% has access to it within their homes or on site (Republic of Rwanda 2010), with the 
remainder using water from a public tap in their neighbourhood. Here, public tap means a public 
water point (stand post or kiosk) from which people can purchase water. In Rwanda’s case, such 
water points are considered an alternative close to the piped water on the premises. These stand posts 
are mainly conceived for low-income households and those living in informal settlements. Water from 
kiosks is mostly sold in 20-litre jerrycans. Households who lack a piped connection inside their homes 
sometimes also rely on other the non-tap alternatives available, such as protected and unprotected 
springs
2
 and tube wells
3
 (Republic of Rwanda 2009a). 
 
Water tariffs represent a heavy burden – particularly for the poor and for unconnected households. In 
fact, even the public tap – which constitutes the main coping source for most unconnected households 
– seems to be costly. The average cost of water from a public tap is US$1.23/m³ (RWF 14 per 
jerrycan), but it can go up to US$3.52/m³ (RWF 40 per jerrycan) for certain pumped systems. 
 
Statistics show also that, in Rwanda, about one third of all households consume unsafe water from 
unprotected sources and are, therefore, exposed to worms, dysentery and cholera – all of which are 
associated with a lack of hygiene (Republic of Rwanda 2009b). Furthermore, the average time taken 
to reach a source of drinking water is estimated to be 25 minutes for the whole country, which varies 
for different parts of the country (Republic of Rwanda 2010). 
 
This paper looks at households who currently lack piped tap water in their homes and who deflect 
their demand to the alternative coping sources available. 
                                                     
2
 Protected springs are typically protected from run-off, bird droppings and animals by a ‘spring box’ 
constructed of brick, masonry or concrete, and built around the spring so that water flows directly out of 
the box into a pipe or cistern without being exposed to outside pollution. Unprotected springs are subject 
to run-off, bird droppings, or the entry of animals. 
3
 A tube well is a deep hole that has been drilled with the purpose of reaching groundwater supplies. Water 
is delivered through a pump which is powered by human, animal, wind, electric, diesel or solar means. In 
the case of Rwanda, the pump is usually powered by human means (see 
http://www.wssinfo.org/definitions-methods/watsan-categories/, last accessed 6 March 2013). 
4
  
3. Literature 
 
In developing countries, many households rely on several water sources, each with its own particular 
characteristics, such as perceived quality, reliability, distance, and price (Whittington and Swarna 
1994). In such countries, many households lack piped connections in their homes (Nauges and 
Whittington 2010) and, thus, rely on different coping sources. 
 
Various means, including household surveys, experimental approaches and hedonic methods, have 
been used to model water demand behaviour in developing countries. However, modelling 
households’ water access is complex: the accessible sources cannot necessarily be assumed to be 
exogenous. 
 
For the case of Rwanda, for example, cheap alternatives to tap water have been developed within each 
district due to the failure of the current system to satisfy the growing demand in tap water. The 
alternatives developed in a specific district may depend on a variety of factors, such as the average 
household income, the state of infrastructure, and the location of the district. Similarly, unconnected 
households might have chosen to settle in a particular area taking into account the availability of 
water, among other factors.  
 
Single-equation models of water demand have been used for data from developed countries, and 
several studies have tried to mimic this approach using data from developing countries. The results 
from the work by Hubell (1977) on water demand for metered households in Nairobi, Kenya, could be 
considered as preliminary evidence of reasonable price and income elasticities; however, as has been 
noted by Whittington and KyeongAe (1992), for example, the results have little applicability to cases 
where households collect water from non-tap sources. 
 
In the western region of Saudi Arabia, Abu Rizaiza (1991) conducted separate estimates of water 
demand equations for residential water use in houses supplied by a public pipe network, and such use 
in houses supplied by tankers. His findings suggest that residential water use varies according to the 
difference in incomes, temperature and price of water. The estimated price elasticity was found to be 
close to values normally found in more industrialised countries, but the income elasticity was lower. 
 
In Indonesia, Crane (1994) focused on separate water demand equations for households supplied by 
water vendors and those using hydrants. He found that neither household resale nor hydrants were 
perfect substitutes to the expanded piped water system due to the high costs associated with these 
types of water. He also found that the demand for vended water was significantly influenced by its 
price, the time required to collect it, and the capacity of the home water reservoir. The demand for 
hydrant water, on the other hand, was influenced by its price, the quantity of water purchased from 
vendors (the main substitute source), and the age of the head of the household. The price elasticities 
from both hydrant and vended water are in the same range as, and consistent with those found in, 
other developing countries. However, in Crane’s model, water demand is not responsive to income 
variation, and is not significantly affected by differences in family size and other family and 
community characteristics. 
 
In the Philippines, David and Inocencio (1998) estimated water demand equations for households 
supplied by vendors, and for those with a private supply connection. They first found that households 
relying on private waterworks generally belonged to a higher income group. Furthermore, in both 
cases, simultaneity problems due to the fact that the price variable (as one of the explanatory 
variables) is determined by both demand and supply factors were dealt with through the use of two-
stage least squares in the estimation. Explanatory variables such as price, monthly household income, 
household size, distance from sources, and dummy variables representing mode of vending water and 
taste, respectively, were significant. 
 
5
 Rietveld et al. (2000) estimated a water demand equation for households with a piped connection in 
Indonesia. In their study, water consumed was a function of a set of household features, namely the 
marginal price of water and the virtual income.
4
 Results showed that very low-income households 
appeared to be slightly more sensitive to price increases than their higher-income counterparts. 
Furthermore, water consumption depended strongly on household size.  
 
Basani et al. (2008) estimated both an access-to-water-network equation and a water demand equation 
in Cambodia. For the water demand relationship, key independent variables were price, connection 
fee, household expenditure (as a proxy for income) and location dummies. However, the absence of 
substantial variation in the price measures led the authors to conclude that the estimates related to 
price elasticity of demand were to be treated with a bit of caution because of limitations of the 
available data.  
 
However, where households rely on different water sources, a combination of the source choice 
model and a model of water use conditional upon source choice was found to be more helpful 
(Nauges and Whittington 2010). With data collected in Ukunda, Kenya, Mu et al. (1990) developed 
and estimated a discrete choice model of a household’s water source decision, and compared it with 
the traditional demand model. The results showed that a household’s choice of water source was 
influenced by the time it took to collect water from the various sources, the price of water, and the 
number of women in the household in question. However, household income was not significant. 
 
Using data from Faisalabad in Pakistan, Madanat and Humplick (1993) modelled the relation between 
a household’s choices of water supply and their connection decisions. Using a multinomial logit, two 
types of explanatory variables were included in the source choices model: socio-economic attributes 
(indicators of income, education, household size, and the presence of a storage tank) and source 
attributes (households’ perception of the highest quality water source, state of repair of the hand 
pump, piped water pressure level, and change in piped water quality since connection). The results 
showed that different dimensions of a household’s decision-making process were interrelated, but due 
to a lack of variability in the data, the coefficient associated with the household size variable was 
insignificant – although it was expected that larger households were more likely to use a more reliable 
source. 
 
In her study, Hindman Persson (2002) analysed household choice with respect to the source of 
drinking water in the rural Philippines using a discrete choice approach. An analysis of the effects of 
input prices (time costs), taste and household size on the choice probabilities revealed that time costs 
had a negative and significant effect, but that taste (proxied by income) had an ambiguous effects on 
household choice. 
 
By looking at the linkages between poverty, education, access to water and household water use in 
Madagascar, Larson et al. (2006) estimated a reduced-form water demand function for a household 
that was conditional in respect of the water source. Their results showed that better-educated and 
higher-income households relied significantly more on private water supplies and used significantly 
more water. When one applied the contingent valuation method, the findings suggested that the 
willingness to pay for improved access was price-sensitive. 
 
However, as Nauges and Whittington (2010) point out, data collected for the purpose of modelling 
source choices made by households in developing countries that have multiple potential sources 
normally miss a step: they only include questions on the water source actually used by the household, 
and ignore attributes of those sources that are not chosen. Nauges and Whittington (ibid.) argue that a 
household’s decision to buy water from a vendor, for example, will depend both on the price to be 
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 Virtual income is the monetary income plus the implicit income transfer given by the difference between 
what a household would pay if all units were charged at the price of the last unit consumed (the marginal 
rate) and what it actually pays. 
6
 paid for using that water, and on the time it might take to get water from a tube well. Thus, only 
studying the attributes of the water source actually chosen will paint a biased picture of the 
household’s decision-making. 
 
One of the few studies to include the attributes of sources not chosen is Nauges and Strand (2007), 
who studied water demand among non-tap households in Central American cities by first estimating 
the probability that a specific water source would be chosen by the household. They considered that 
unconnected households spent time hauling
5
 water from coping sources, and that this time had an 
opportunity cost. Therefore, they transformed the hauling time into a corresponding pecuniary time 
cost by using the average hourly wage in the household as the shadow cost of time. The demand 
equation was described by the relationship between water consumption on the one hand and, on the 
other, the full cost of water, household income, family size, whether members of the household were 
literate, lot size, size of the constructed area, and the availability of electricity. Their results showed 
that the total water cost (the sum of the water price and the hauling time) had the traditional negative 
effect on water demand. Household demand was also found to be responsive to income variation, with 
bigger families showing lower per capita consumption.  
 
However, although Nauges and Strand (ibid.) used the full cost of the water (price + time cost), they 
should also have used Full income rather than Monetary income as an explanatory variable. They 
were, in fact, inconsistent, given that the money foregone by the use of time spent on collecting water 
had to be added to the monetary income in order to constitute the full income. Otherwise, if one 
considers the monetary income together with the full cost of water, one risks ending up with a 
situation where people ‘spend’ more on water than they have actually received in monetary terms. 
 
By using the multinomial logit model to estimate the non-tap water demand among unconnected 
households, the present study is close to that by Nauges and Strand (ibid.). However, in the present 
study, an additional  assumption is included: the household’s decision to purchase water from a public 
tap, somebody else’s private tap, or a protected or unprotected spring depends not only on the price of 
any of these four sources, but also on the attributes of the other sources – whether chosen or not. In 
the present case, the Full cost (expressed as the difference in the full cost between a public tap and 
other coping sources) variable for each source has been in the model; and through it, we include the 
attributes of unchosen sources.  
 
Thus, following the same reasoning as Nauges and Strand (ibid.), the household demand function for 
unconnected households is estimated by means of a two-step method in order to correct selection bias 
in the spirit of Heckman (1979).  
 
4. Data 
 
In 2011, Rwanda conducted an Integrated Household Survey which collected data on household water 
use as well as other household-level information. However, as with many other household surveys in 
developing countries, no information was collected as regards water sources other than the one which 
the household actually used. Therefore, we conducted an independent survey on urban water use. 
 
The data set used here comes from a household survey conducted from January to April 2011 
involving 700 households in five urban areas of Rwanda. The largest share (500 households) of the 
sample was based in Rwanda’s capital, Kigali, which comprises the districts of Gasabo, Kicukiro and 
Nyarugenge. The remaining 200 households resided in two other selected urban districts, namely 
Huye and Nyagatare.
 
The data collection was undertaken in a team together with eight research 
assistants. The types of questions asked during the fieldwork are summarised in Appendix B hereto. 
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 Hauling time refers to the time spent by a household to collect water. 
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 For the sampling method, we first clustered the population into the five existing provinces. Since the 
targeted population were those living in urban areas, and since the capital city constituted the main 
urban centre, we considered Kigali Province as a separate cluster. With simple random sampling, we 
then selected two of the four remaining provinces, namely Southern Province and Eastern Province. 
In these selected provinces we randomly selected two urban districts, namely Nyagatare (Eastern 
Province) and Huye (Southern Province). Since Kigali city’s population totals around 1,100,000, and 
the average household size is 4.4 persons in urban areas and the sampling ratio is 1:500, the sample 
size for the capital city became approximately 500 households. As Gasabo is the most populated 
district in Kigali city (with almost 530,000 habitants), using the same formula we selected a total 
sample of 237 households for that district, of which 189 were not connected to the piped network. 
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
The whole data set covers two groups of households: 
 Those currently connected to the tap water system, but who still rely on a coping source in 
case their water is interrupted, and 
 Those who are unconnected and use a variety of coping sources. 
 
This study, which focused on the latter group, produced data on the water demand and related costs 
for 495 unconnected households. Data on the quantity and prices of water for unconnected households 
who rely on non-piped sources were based on self-reported information, which could induce errors in 
measurement. However, water is an important component of the full expenditure of many of these 
households, and it seems reasonable to assume that they will have a fair idea of the attributes of the 
various sources available. Households in the same area generally reported similar prices for the 
various alternatives available in that area, which indicates that the choice of water source is well-
informed. 
 
Table 1 describes variables to be used in further sections. Among the variables, the per capita water 
consumption was constructed by summing the total amount of water that households used in a month 
from all sources. The price of water was the unit price
6
 for water purchased by households. The Full 
income variable is the full value of a household’s time, given that household’s hourly wage. We 
constructed the Time cost variable by transforming the monthly hauling time into a pecuniary time 
cost by using the average hourly wage (from monthly monetary income) in the household as the 
shadow cost of time. In fact, the source attributes (e.g. price and time cost) and household 
characteristics (full income, years of schooling, household size and lot size) were considered in the 
model to account for heterogeneity in preferences. There were alternative options, such as using the 
distance to water instead of time. However, we found in the pilot that households had problems 
estimating the distances to unchosen sources, but that they were able to estimate the time 
consumption. Therefore, we found it better to use the Full cost variable. 
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
Table 2 describes the average monthly per capita water consumption and the average cost for each 
source for the unconnected household subsample. The weighted average consumption is 0.28 m
3 
per 
capita per month; the weighted average monetary cost without a time cost became US$0.40/m
3
 per 
month; and the weighted average full cost including the time cost came to US$1.81/m
3
 per month. 
Unconnected households spend a lot of time collecting water from public taps and protected springs. 
Water from public taps is the most expensive – regardless of which cost measure is used. 
 
<Table 2 about here> 
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 To standardise unit prices, we construct the variable price as the price per cubic metre. 
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 The descriptive statistics show that unconnected households register a high consumption of water 
from somebody else’s private tap. Rwanda has an increasing block tariff which is intended to ensure 
that all households have cheap access to water for their subsistence needs; however, compared with 
the first and lowest block, unconnected households actually pay more for their water from somebody 
else’s private tap. In general, by adding the time cost – which is quite high for all sources – to the 
price of water, one could say that non-tap water is far more expensive than that from the piped 
network. 
 
Table 3 shows the average monthly per capita water consumption across the selected urban districts. 
The results reveal that, in all districts, public taps are the main source of water for unconnected 
households. In the Nyagatare District, unprotected springs constitute a second preferred source. For 
this latter district, due to the long distances that household members need to walk to get to the nearest 
water point, there is a trade-off between hauling free water and buying expensive water from a public 
tap. Except for the Nyagatare District, somebody else’s private tap constituted the second most 
common source for the remaining districts. 
 
<Table 3 about here> 
 
Overall, 87% of unconnected households use only one source (Table 4); 11% combine water from 
two sources; and only 2% combine three or more sources. For those who use only one source, the 
main share (53%) of water used comes from the public tap. In general, sources used vary across 
districts, while water availability and frequency vary across sources. For the subgroup of households 
using two sources, we see that one source dominates in most cases.  
 
<Table 4 about here> 
 
Non-tap water not only imposes extra costs compared with tap water; it may also expose users to the 
risk of disease. As has been reported by Nauges and Van den Berg (2009), the lack of safe water and 
all things related to inadequate sanitation facilities are amongst the main causes of precariousness of 
life in many developing countries. This can be applied to the case of Rwanda as well, where 
households who lack a tap water connection run high risks of contracting a water-related disease. 
Comparing both unconnected and connected households, the results from our own survey show that, 
for example, 33% of the former group fell prey to diarrhoea and 45% contracted intestinal worms 
during 2010, while for the other group 22% got diarrhoea and 40% suffered from intestinal worms. 
 
From some basics statistics (see Table 5), it is clear that, compared with connected households, the 
unconnected subgroup registers lower household incomes, lower school enrolment rates, etc. In brief, 
all characteristics show that connected households are better off socio-economically than unconnected 
ones. The differences are statistically significant for income, education level, and hauling time for 
water.  
 
<Table 5 about here> 
 
5. Model specification and estimation procedures 
 
As has been mentioned by, for example, Nauges and Whittington (2010), in developed countries 
where only one source of water is used, the residential water demand function in such countries can 
be specified as a single equation, as follows: 
 
            (1) 
 
The function (1) describes how the quantity of water used,  , is determined by price  , income  , and 
a vector of socio-economic characteristics   (to control for heterogeneity of preferences and other 
variables affecting water demand).  
 
9
 However, in developing countries, where households use water from several different sources, this 
equation cannot be directly applied; and different ways of deriving and estimating the demand 
function have been suggested instead. 
 
In the present case, the demand equation is estimated for all sources of water used by unconnected 
households. However, for the choice of source, different factors might be observed as well as their 
impact on the demand function. 
 
5.1 Assumptions 
 
Considering previous background information, access to non-tap water sources should not be regarded 
as exogenous in the demand equation for unconnected households. Thus, in order to avoid selection 
bias in the demand function estimation for the unconnected households, various factors need to be 
controlled. Although it is common in all districts for households to use different sources of water, the 
preferences registered in respect of the sources available might be heterogeneous due to 
characteristics of the household or of the water sources. 
 
In the current study, we control for variables such as education level, full income, full cost, size of 
household, lot size, district dummies, and attributes of sources that are available but not used. Factors 
such as full cost and full income will simultaneously determine the choice of source and the amount 
of water demanded. Previous studies on water demand in developing countries (see e.g. David and 
Inocencio 1998; Abu Rizaiza 1991; Larson et al. 2006; Nauges and Strand 2007) found a significant 
link between households’ monetary income and their choice of what source to use as well as the 
quantity of water demanded. Specifically, higher-income households relied on more sources of water 
and used more water. In the present study, as noted previously, we use the Full income rather than 
Monetary income variable, so that we consider the full value of a household’s time, given its hourly 
earnings.  
 
Since not all existing non-tap water sources are equally accessible, the household size and lot size 
might determine both the selection and the outcome. For example, some previous findings (see e.g. 
David and Inocencio 1998; Nauges and Strand 2007) showed that the larger the family and the plot, 
the more likely a safer source would be used, and the lower the per capita consumption. Moreover, a 
household’s decision to select a particular source might depend not only on the characteristics of that 
source, but also on the attributes of other sources. Furthermore, in order to control for potential 
differences in the effects of any of the variables on the water demand across the districts, we tried 
including interaction terms between district dummies and the other variables. However, referring to 
Nauges and Strand (2007), and by performing a Wald test of parameter equality, we could not find 
any differences in the effects of any of the variables across districts; we only included district-specific 
intercepts, therefore.
7
 
 
Education level is also controlled for. This variable is a good predictor of water source choice, but has 
no direct effect on the per capita water consumption. Thus, this variable does not appear in the 
demand equation. Larson et al. (2006) found that better-educated households relied significantly more 
on private water supplies. In most of the literature cited previously herein, the demand was found to 
be sensitive to price change; hence, the Price change variable has been included in the demand model. 
However, as in Nauges and Strand (2007), the full price of water (water price + monetised hauling 
time) has been considered here and not only the monetary cost. 
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 The exact sample size from the various urban groups does not matter because the groups were very 
similar; thus, there was no need to weight the estimates by population size. The results for unconnected 
households were chi
2 
(10) = 5.48, Prob. > chi
2
 = 0.8570. The null hypothesis of parameter equality 
cannot, therefore, be rejected. 
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 5.2 Estimation procedures 
 
As seen previously, although unconnected households combine different types of coping sources, they 
rely primarily on one source, rather than on all available sources. A discrete choice framework is used 
here to assume that a household will select one of the four available water sources (someone else’s 
private tap, a public tap, a protected spring or an unprotected spring) so as to maximise its utility. A 
household chooses coping source    among other alternatives if, and only if, the utility provided by   is 
greater than or equal to that provided by all coping sources   in the choice set; or stated 
mathematically, if       for all      A household then decides how much water to use from the 
chosen water source. This means that for each alternative  , there is an outcome    of the form – 
 
           (2) 
 
where    is the total water demanded from coping source  ,   is the vector containing all 
determinants of the variable of interest, i.e.              ,    the pecuniary time cost for source  , 
and    is the vector of unknown parameter to be estimated.  
 
Households then derive utility from the option  , given by – 
 
           (3) 
 
where    is the observable component of utility, and    is the unobservable or stochastic component. 
Although the researcher cannot observe the respondent’s utility, s/he can observe some attributes of 
the alternatives (such as the full cost) and some of the household’s characteristics (like income, 
education level, household size, and lot size). 
 
The observable or deterministic component of the utility estimated by the researcher is then a function 
of the attributes of alternatives, and of the respondents’ characteristics. 
  
The systematic component of the utility function can be written as       , where   is a vector of 
characteristics determining the respondent’s choice of water source and     a vector of alternative-
specific parameters. These parameters relate the characteristics of a respondent     to the 
respondent’s utility for the jth choice. They are individual respondent-specific characteristics, i.e. the 
effect of independent variables varies across all source choices.  
 
Thus, we have – 
 
            (4) 
 
From the above assumptions, our model reveals that a household’s choice of coping source might be 
correlated with observed and unobserved household characteristics, and that the latter might be 
unobserved determinants of water demand. From this point of view, the disturbance term    in     
will not be independent of all    in    . Our model might then suffer from selection bias and this 
problem will lead to biased estimates of the   parameter. Thus, least-square estimates of   would not 
be consistent in respect of these correlations between the explanatory variables and the disturbance 
term in equation   ). To deal with this problem, Heckman’s (1979) two-step method is employed to 
correct for selection bias by using a multinomial logit to model the choice selection issue in the first 
step and a linear regression with selectivity in the second step. 
 
5.2.1 First step: Multinomial logit as a selection model 
 
The Multinomial logit is used here to explain the choice made by households for a particular source of 
water among other alternatives. This model is suitable since the dependent variable, i.e. various 
11
 options of water sources available to households, has more than two outcomes without any natural 
ordering. 
 
When one uses the multinomial logit model, there is an assumption that the unobservable part of the 
utility functions    are independent and identically Gumbel
8
 distributed (the IIA hypothesis; see e.g. 
Bourguignon et al. 2007). As described by McFadden (1973), this specification leads to the 
multinomial logit model, with probability as follows: 
 
          
         
∑          
  (5) 
 
which define the probability that the utility from choice source   is greater than or equal to the 
utility from all of the other choices. 
 
This expression enables one to obtain consistent maximum likelihood estimates of the (  )  The 
estimation of the model provides results that can be used to predict this probability for each 
household. However, the problem is to estimate the parameter vector   . In order to obtain a 
consistent estimate of   one has to incorporate a transformation of these predicted probabilities as an 
additional explanatory variable. 
 
Various bias correction parameters have been proposed in the literature (see Bourguignon et al. 2007). 
Lee generalised Heckman’s method to apply to the case where the selection is based on a multinomial 
logit model. Lee has developed a useful consistent two-step estimator that could be applied to 
multinomial logit–OLS9 regression sample selection models. His method is based on a transformation 
of univariate order statistics. 
 
For the present study, Lee’s correction term and the two-step estimations have been implemented by 
first estimating the        with a multinomial logit in order to form   ̂  and then including that in the 
demand function in order to get consistent estimates of   and     by least squares. 
 
5.2.2 Second step: Linear regression with selectivity 
 
Following the first step, the demand function becomes –10 
 
           (  ̂ )     (6) 
 
where    is the covariance of the error terms,     are the coefficient terms for the polychotomous 
correction of selectivity bias, and    is an error parameter orthogonal to the rest of the terms, with a 
mean expectation equal to zero. This property allows the use of OLS in the estimation. 
 
Thus, the demand equation was estimated using the Lee correction method for bias (Lee 1983) and 
adds to the explanatory variables a series of variables obtained from the first step. These variables are 
consistent estimators of conditional expected values of the residuals derived from the multinomial 
logit model. The coefficients on these variables are functions of the covariance between the residual 
in the regression and the residuals (or some function of the residuals) from the multinomial logit 
model. Furthermore, in order to control and check the stability of the results, the standard errors were 
bootstrapped by using 500 replications. 
 
                                                     
8
 Their cumulative and density functions are, respectively,                                    
     . 
9
 Ordinary least squares. 
10
 The derivation of the function      is in Appendix A. 
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 6. Results 
 
6.1 First-step estimation: Probability of choosing a specified source 
 
Table 6 reports the results of the multinomial logit regression used to estimate the probability that a 
specified source will be chosen. It can be seen that the regressors are jointly significant at the 0.01 
level, with a likelihood ratio test chi
2
 (18) = 43.03. We found that, relative to using a public tap, with 
an additional year of education the typical household’s probability of using a protected spring 
decreased by about 5%, while the probability of using someone else’s private tap increased by about 
8%. From this we can conclude that those with more education were more likely to use someone 
else’s private tap source than a public tap, but at the same time they were more likely to use the public 
tap rather than the protected spring. As income increases, the probability of using a protected spring 
decreases relative to using a public tap. Furthermore, an additional member of the household will 
decrease the probability of using protected and unprotected spring sources, relative to using a public 
tap.  
 
In order to shed more light on the partial effects of all of the above regressors on sources outcomes, 
i.e. on how these probabilities change as regressors change, we turn to Table 7. The tabulated results 
imply that, holding everything else constant (at the mean), a one-unit change in education, 
corresponding to a single additional year, increases – by about 0.01 each – the probability of using 
both a public tap and someone else’s private tap as sources. Furthermore, a one-unit change in full 
income, equivalent to a US$1 increase in full monthly income, increases by 0.0002 and 0.0004, 
respectively, the probability of using a public tap and someone else’s private tap source. 
 
Again, the estimated marginal effects show that a US$1 increase in the full cost per cubic metre of 
water from a public tap decreases by 0.51 the probability of using water from that source, and 
increases the probability of hauling water from alternative sources, i.e. water from someone else’s 
private tap or from a protected or unprotected spring. In fact, as Table 7 shows, if the cost difference
11
 
increases, households are more likely to choose water from someone else’s private tap or from a 
protected or unprotected spring. 
 
<Tables 6 and 7 about here> 
 
We also considered the case where the cost of other alternatives changes.
12
 Table 8 shows that, if the 
unit cost of the protected spring source increases by US$1, the probability of using it decreases by 
0.03 and the probability of using someone else’s private tap increases by 0.03. For the unprotected 
spring, the estimated marginal effect shows that a US$1 increase in the unit cost of water from that 
source decreases the probability of using it by 0.3, but increases the probability of using water from a 
public tap by 0.03.The probability of using the public tap source increases by 0.34, that of using 
unprotected increases by 0.1 and that of using someone else’s private tap decreases by 0.4 if the unit 
cost of water from a private tap increases by US$1.  
 
<Table 8 about here> 
 
One of the most widely discussed aspects of the multinomial logit model is its assumed independence 
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). The IIA assumption is limited in the case of commodities that are 
close substitutes. However, for the present study, we believe that coping sources currently used by 
                                                     
11
 The cost difference is defined as the cost of water from the public tap minus the cost of the alternative. 
Thus, if the cost difference increases, the cost of the public tap (in time and/or money) increases relative 
to the cost of the alternative. 
12
   We estimated, separately, the marginal effects of the same regressors as those in Table 7, but here we 
instead included the cost of each alternative. However, for the Unprotected spring and Someone else’s 
private tap sources, we report only the marginal effect for the change of the cost on source outcomes. 
13
 households are quite different from each other (in terms of reliability, safety, cost, distance, etc.), and 
households cannot simply lump any two sources together as close substitutes, e.g. by choosing Public 
tap together with Protected/unprotected spring. This implies that the IIA assumption works for the 
present case. We used a standard test of IIA (Hausman and McFadden 1984) and all results were 
consistent with the IIA hypothesis. 
 
6.2 The second step: Estimation of water demand function 
 
Table 9a summarises the results of the water demand function estimates. The full income elasticity is 
observed to be 0.10. This is in line with previous findings in the literature. As mentioned by Nauges 
and Whittington (2010), income elasticity is generally found to be quite low, most often in the 0.1–0.3 
range, in studies estimating water demand in developing countries. For the present study, the 
Monetary income variable was also used in comparison with its Full income counterpart. The results 
in Table 9b show that the monetary income elasticity is very low (0.03) compared with the full 
income elasticity. 
 
A negative significant effect was found for household size, which means that the per capita water 
consumption decreased with the number of members in the household. As the number of bedrooms 
increased, the per capita consumption fell. These results are also in line with previous findings in 
similar literature. There might be evidence of selectivity in the latter result, since the estimated 
coefficient of the first Lee correction term is negative and significant. In their similar findings, Nauges 
and Strand (2007) highlighted the positive correlation between the disturbance term    in the demand 
equation and the disturbance term    in the selection model. This reveals that some unobserved 
household characteristics are correlated with a household’s choice and use of a coping source. 
 
The total cost elasticities vary from -0.6 (protected spring, someone else’s private tap) to -0.2 (public 
tap). These results primarily reflect an inelasticity of water demand in the present study. Furthermore, 
as the public tap is most convenient coping source, its demand becomes more inelastic than that of the 
other alternatives. These findings are again in line with previous findings in the literature. 
 
For robustness checks, we examined how the main coefficient estimates behaved by including 
alternative variables. We found that the results for the main coefficients remained largely similar.
13
  
 
<Tables 9a and 9b about here> 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The current study reports results from cross-sectional data collected in various urban areas of Rwanda 
during a surveyed subgroup of 495 households without tap connections. These households used a 
variety of coping sources and sometimes combined water from different sources. Statistics show that 
87% of the respondents used only one water source, while 11% used two sources, and 2% combined 
three or more sources. 
 
The findings reveal that 57% of unconnected households used a public tap as their main coping 
source. Furthermore, the overall average consumption was 0.28 m
3 
per capita per month, the overall 
average cost without the hauling time cost was registered at US$0.40/m
3
 per month, and that the 
average cost, including the value of hauling time and the time spent waiting one’s turn at the source in 
question, was US$1.81/m
3
 per month.  
 
Compared with connected households, unconnected households register a low income and a low 
school enrolment rate. Using the full income variable, results give an income elasticity of 0.10 for 
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 Results are not presented here, but can be provided on request. 
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 these categories of households. The total cost elasticities vary between -0.6 (somebody else’s private 
tap) to -0.2 (public tap). 
 
For the unselected sources, the Full cost variable (i.e. the difference in the full cost compared with the 
public tap) was added as an explanatory variable in the logit. Our findings suggest that the more 
expensive public tap source made people more likely to choose water from elsewhere.  
 
An alternative explanation is that people were more likely to choose the public tap source if water 
from someone else’s private tap became more expensive. People using water from a protected spring 
as their main source were also more likely to switch to water from someone else’s private tap if the 
cost of the protected-spring source increased.   
 
From these findings, it is important to be able to predict what kind of potential and suitable 
improvements in water demand and management that might result from an appropriate policy. Here it 
can be assumed that, for the case of Rwanda, poor households (i.e. unconnected households) cannot 
expect to be connected to the piped network in the short run; thus, improving the current non-tap 
distribution systems could be considered an alternative solution. From assumptions made previously, 
one could therefore say, for example, that the welfare effect of extending public tap connections might 
be immense for this group of households. 
 
For further applications, it might be interesting to do a cost–benefit analysis of, on the one hand, 
extending the current tap water systems so that more unconnected households can be connected, and 
on the other, improving the current non-tap distribution systems so that poor households’ access to 
safe and adequate water is enhanced. In any case, it is important to make assessment for the welfare 
effects of having or not having tap water. 
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Fig. 1 Map of sampling sites 
 
Source: Rwanda Natural Resources Authority, Lands and Mapping Department, May 2013 
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 Table 1 Description of variables 
Variable Description Related survey questions 
Per capita water 
consumption     
Average water consumption 
per household per month 
Amount of water used by the household from their regular 
source each month 
Price     Average price of water 
 
 
Price per cubic metre of water from the household’s 
regular source 
Full income     Household’s full income 
(monetary income + money 
forgone by hauling time) 
 Amount of money remitted by a member of the 
household who works elsewhere  
 Hauling time in respect of regular source 
 Monthly monetary income 
Time cost     Cost of hauling time and  
waiting time 
 Hauling time in respect of regular source 
 Monthly monetary income 
Household size  How many members in the 
household 
Number of male and females in the household (0–5 years, 
6–9 years, 10–18 years, 19–35 years, 36–60 years, 60+ 
years) 
Years of schooling  The respondent’s level of 
education 
If the respondent is educated, his/her level of education 
Lot size Number of bedrooms Number of bedrooms in the house 
Source: Author’s survey 
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 Table 2 Average water consumption and average cost 
Sources 
Average water 
consumption  
(m
3
 per capita 
per month) 
Average cost 
(price/monetary 
cost) without 
time cost 
(US$ per m
3
) 
Average cost 
(price/monetary 
cost) with 
time cost 
(US$ per m
3
) 
Someone else’s private tap 0.40 0.46 0.48 
Public tap 0.60 1.27 4.45 
Tube well 0.01 0.02 0.46 
Protected dug well 0.02 0.07 0.20 
Protected spring 0.38 0.48 3.32 
Unprotected spring 0.17 0.12
14
 0.90 
Cart with small tank 0.003 0.02 0.12 
Surface 0.03 0.10 0.11 
Other 0.01 0.05 1.18 
Weighted average 0.28 0.40 1.81 
Source: Author’s survey 
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 For the Unprotected spring and Surface categories, the cost is related to the price charged by vendors 
who carry and sell water to households. 
20
 Table 3 Average water consumption across selected urban districts (m3 per capita per month) 
Variable  Kigali     
Kicukiro Gasabo Nyarugenge  Huye Nyagatare 
Someone else’s private 
tap
15
 
0.22 0.45 0.48  0.47 – 
Public tap 0.66 0.59 0.64  0.56 0.53 
Tube well 0.02 0.001 –16  0.001 0.08 
Protected dug well – 0.004 0.01  0.002 0.01 
Protected spring 0.08 0.13 0.07  0.11 0.04 
Unprotected spring – 0.05 0.02  0.10 0.48 
Cart with small tank 0.002 0.01 –  – – 
Surface
17
 0.001 0.004 0.06  0.01 0.09 
Other 0.0003 0.01 –  – 0.01 
Source: Author’s survey 
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 Here, reference is made to piped water either into the dwelling or into the yard. Some 91% of 
respondents use water piped into their yard, while very few have water piped into their dwellings. 
16
 The source exists in the area, but was not used by any of the households in the study sample. 
17
 River, dam, lake, pond, stream, canal or irrigation channel. 
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 Table 4 Households combining different types of coping source and the share of water for each 
source 
 
Coping source 
 
 
One coping source used 
 
 
Share of water
18
 
 
Someone else’s private tap 11%  
Public tap 53%  
Protected spring 13%  
Unprotected spring 7%  
Other 2%  
Percentage of households using one 
source 
87%  
 
Two coping sources used 
Share of water for the most 
common combinations
19
 
Share of water coming from the 
main source 
Someone else’s private tap 
combined with an additional source 
7% (Someone else’s private tap water 
62% of this) 
 
Public tap combined with an 
additional source 
 
4% (Public tap water 77% of this) 
Other combination 1% 
 
 
Percentage of households 
combining two sources 
11%  
 
Three coping sources used 
 
 
Share of water
20
 
 
 
Three coping sources used 
 
Percentage of households 
combining three sources 
 
2% 
 
2% 
 
Source: Author’s survey 
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 Cubic metres per capita per month. 
19
 Cubic metres per capita per month. 
20
 Cubic metres per capita per month. 
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 Table 5 Descriptive statistics among connected and unconnected households 
 Unconnected Connected 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Monthly full household 
income (US$) 
267.97 370.77 385.03 511.73 
Years of schooling 7.78 4.947 9.36 5.01 
Household size 5.49 2.38 5.59 2.68 
Number of bedrooms 3.20 1.16 3.24 1.27 
Hauling time  
(minutes per month) 
627.88 807.17 225.17 460.16 
Source: Author’s survey 
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 Table 6 Multinomial logit estimation (public tap = comparison group) 
Variables Protected spring 
Unprotected 
spring 
Someone else’s 
private tap 
Robust standard errors 
in parentheses 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,  
* p<0.1 
Household’s full 
income (US$) 
-0.00114** -0.00103 -0.000402 
 
 
(0.000539) (0.000641) (0.000641) 
 
Years of schooling -0.0572** -0.0206 0.0721*** 
 
 
(0.0312) (0.0272) (0.0277) 
 
Household size -0.189** -0.146** -0.0570 
 
 
(0.0738) (0.0618) (0.0625) 
 
Number of bedrooms 0.0787 0.00904 0.158 
 
 
(0.153) (0.112) (0.140) 
 
Difference in full cost 2.259*** 2.408*** 1.412*** 
 
 
(0.623) (0.644) (0.511) 
 
Constant -2.559*** -2.884*** -2.401***  
 (0.686) (0.654) (0.593)  
Measures of fit     
Log likelihood -510.62233    
Likelihood ratio 
test, chi
2 
(18) 
43.03    
Prob. > chi
2
 0.0000    
Observations 495 495 495  
Source: Author’s survey 
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 Table 7 Marginal effects on the probability of using each of the four non-tap sources 
Variables  Public tap Protected spring 
Unprotected 
spring 
Someone else's 
private tap 
Robust standard 
errors in 
parentheses 
     
*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05,  
* p<0.1 
Household's full 
income (US$) 
0.0002* -0.0004* -0.0001 0.0004*  
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.00008) (0.00006)  
Years of schooling 0.0103*** -0.00227 0.000553 0.00861***  
(0.00485) (0.00305) (0.00372) (0.00278)  
 
Household size 0.0320*** -0.0155** -0.0162* -0.000295  
 
(0.0116) (0.00707) (0.00834) (0.00629)  
 
Number of bedrooms -0.0174 0.00566 -0.00368 0.0155  
 
(0.0226) (0.0149) (0.0153) (0.0142)  
 
Difference in full cost 
(US$/m
3
) 
-0.504*** 0.162*** 0.275*** 0.0667*  
 
(0.146) (0.0492) (0.0757) (0.0358)  
 
Observations 495 495 495 495  
 
Source: Author’s survey 
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 Table 8 Marginal effects if the cost of only one of the alternative sources changes 
Variables Public tap 
Protected 
spring 
Unprotected 
spring 
Someone else's 
private tap 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,  
* p<0.1 
Household's 
full income 
(US$) 
0.0002** -0.0001** -0.0001 0.0003* 
  
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00007) 
 
      
Years of 
schooling 
0.072* 0.0188 -0.063** 0.050* 
 
(0.042) (0.0363) (0.0429) (0.048) 
  
       
Household 
size 
0.033*** -0.0159** -0.015** -0.0001 
  
(0.0117) (0.0071) (0.0082) (0.0065) 
  
       
Number of 
bedrooms 
-0.0186 0.0042 0.002 0.012 
  
(0.0229) (0.00427) (0.0154) (0.014) 
  
       
Cost of public 
tap 
-
0.0085*** 
0.0027*** 0.005** 0.001** 
  
(0.0024) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.001) 
  
       
Cost of 
protected 
spring 
0.055 -0.026** 0.050 0.028**   
(0.033) (0.012) (0.036) (0.011)   
       
Cost of 
unprotected 
spring 
0.025* 0.044 -0.338* 0.04   
(0.149) (0.031) (0.209) (0.031)   
       
Cost of 
private tap 
0.345*** 0.004 0.078*** -0.427*** 
  
 (0.114) (0.130) (0.003) (0.043)   
Observations 495 495 495 495 
  
Source: Author’s survey 
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 Table 9a Estimation of water demand function (Full income) 
Dependent variable: Monthly water use 
(log) per household member 
Estimated coefficient
a
 
Bootstrapped 
standard error
b
 
Student’s t-test  
Constant 0.112 0.441 0.28 
Log(total cost(public tap))
21
 -0.150** 0.060 -2.65 
Log(total cost(protected spring)) -0.636*** 0.282 -2.54 
Log(total cost(unprotected spring)) -0.045 0.099 -0.54 
Log(total cost(private tap)) -0.612** 0.274 -2.43 
Log(full income) 0.103* 0.081 1.39 
Log(lot size(number of bedrooms)) -0.475*** 0.117 -4.06 
Log(household size) -0.169*** 0.018 -8.72 
Kicukiro dummy district -0.072 0.116 -0.26 
Nyarugenge dummy district -0.280*** 0.086 -2.82 
Lee correction parameter 1
c
 -0.866** 0.379 -2.20 
Lee correction parameter 2 -0.007 1.886 -0.06 
Lee correction parameter 3 1.096 1.949 0.56 
Lee correction parameter 4 -0.208 0.846 -0.24 
Observations 495   
Wald test of parameter equality (four 
sources) 
33.19   
p-value 0.001   
a ***,** and * significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
b 500 replications 
c Water sources: Public tap, Protected spring, Unprotected spring, Someone else’s private tap 
Source: Author’s survey 
 
  
                                                     
21
 All costs and income variables are in US$, adjusted for purchasing power parity. 
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 Table 9b Estimation of water demand function (Monetary income) 
Dependent variable: Monthly water use 
(log) per household member 
Estimated 
coefficient
a
 
Bootstrapped 
standard error
b
 
Student’s t-test 
Constant 0.223 0.576 0.39 
Log(monetary cost(public tap))
1
 -0.128** 0.094 -2.36 
Log(monetary cost(protected spring)) -0.704** 0.295 -2.38 
Log(monetary cost(unprotected spring)) -0.053 0.059 -0.90 
Log(monetary cost(private tap)) -0.717*** 0.266 -2.70 
Log(monetary income) 0.03* 0.044 1.48 
Log(lot size(number of bedrooms)) -0.449*** 0.117 -3.82 
Log(household size) -0.320*** 0.075 -4.23 
Kicukiro dummy district -0.089 0.107 -0.83 
Nyarugenge dummy district -0.271*** 0.084 -3.23 
Lee correction parameter 1
c
 -0.753** 0.385 -1.95 
Lee correction parameter 2 0.113 1.406 0.08 
Lee correction parameter 3 -0.151 0.467 -0.32 
Lee correction parameter 4 -0.336 0.999 -0.34 
Observations 495   
a ***,** and * significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
b 500 replications 
c Water sources: Public tap, Protected spring, Unprotected spring, Someone else’s private tap 
Source: Author’s survey 
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 Appendix A: Lee correction 
 
As has been underlined by Bourguignon et al. (2007), Lee (1983) suggests a generalisation of the two-
step selection bias-correction method in the spirit of Heckman (1979). This model specifies that bias 
correction can be based on the conditional mean of   . 
 
By defining {             }, we have – 
 
                           ∫∫
   (      (             ))
                      
 
  
        (             ) 
 
Let us call    ( |             ) the cumulative distribution function of   . The cumulative 
    ( |             ) is specified by the following transformation: 
 
     ( |             )   
     ( |             )  
 
where   is the standard normal cumulative. By assuming that    and    (  | ) are jointly distributed, 
two assumptions have been developed: 
 
1. Lee’s distributional assumption: The joint distribution of (      (  | )) does not depend 
on   {             } 
2. Lee’s linearity assumption:  (  |    )        (  | ) 
 
The expected value of the disturbance term   , conditional on category   being chosen, is given by – 
 
                                
     ( |(             ))
   ( |(             ))
 
 
with   being the standard normal density. From the form for      hypothesised above, a consistent 
estimator of    is obtained by running the least square on the following equation: 
 
           
     
      
   
      
    
 
Thus, a two-step estimation of precedent equation is obtained by first estimating the     s in order to 
form – 
 
    (  ̂ )   
     ( |(  ̂    ̂     ̂  ))
   ( |(  ̂    ̂     ̂  ))
  
 
and then including that variable in the said equation to estimate    and     consistently by least 
square. 
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 Appendix B: Summary of type of information collected 
 
B1. Background information on each respondent 
 
Age 
Gender 
Marital status 
Head of household or spouse  
Education (Yes/No) 
If educated, years of schooling  
Primary occupation  
Spouse’s occupation 
Personal possessions (Radio, TV, Bicycle, Motorcycle, Mobile phone, Landline telephone, Car, Gas 
stove, Electric stove, Fridge, Solar panels, etc.) 
 
B2. Socio-economic profile of each household  
 
a) Materials used as roofing (Concrete metal sheeting, Tiles, Thatch, Other) 
Ownership of house (Family, Other) 
House features (Number of bedrooms, Number of taps, Number of flush toilets, Number of bathrooms, 
Number of water storage tanks, Number of water heaters, Number of garages) 
Monthly income 
Source of income  
Number of males and females 
Ages of household members (0–5 years, 6–9 years, 10–18 years,19–35 years, 36–59 years, etc.) 
Monthly expenditure (Food, Water, Fuel and lighting, Health, Education, Transport, Electricity, 
Telephone, Liquor and tobacco, etc.) 
Principal type of cooking fuel (Wood, Cow dung, Straw, Coal, Kerosene, Gas, Electricity, etc.) 
Number of members working elsewhere in the country and/or abroad 
Amount of money remitted by members working elsewhere  
Amenities (Electricity only, Water only, Water and electricity, No amenities) 
 
B3. Water sources used 
 
B3.1 Coping sources  
 
b) What source of drinking water – e.g. Piped water into dwelling, Piped water into yard/plot, Public 
tap/standpipe, Tube well/borehole, Protected dug well, Unprotected spring, Rainwater collection, 
Cart with small tank/drum, Tanker-truck, Surface water (river, dam, lake, pond, stream, canal, 
irrigation channels) and Bottled water – was available to the household 
c) If any of the above sources existed, how often the household used them 
d) How much water the household used in a month  
e) How much time it took the household each time they fetched water from any of the above sources 
f) If the household stated they did not use the above sources, how much time would it take them if 
they were to use such sources 
g) The main source of water used by the household for other purposes, such as laundry, bathing and 
house-cleaning 
h) Who in the household regularly fetched water (Female adults, Male adults, Female children, Male 
children, Hired workers, Female and male adults, Female adults and male children, Female and 
male children, Anyone in the house) 
i) Price of water from the regular source 
Affordability of water from the regular source (Most affordable, Affordable, Unaffordable) 
 
B3.2 Water quality and safety 
 
j) Whether or not any member of the household had ever suffered from a waterborne disease 
(Diarrhoea, Worm infections, Typhoid, etc.) in the past year 
k) How respondents rated the colour of the water from their regular source (Very clean, Clean, Dirty, 
Very dirty) 
30
 l) How respondents rated the taste of the water from their regular source (Excellent, Good, Poor, 
Bad) 
m) How respondent rated the safety of water from their regular source (No risk, Little risk, Some 
risk, Serious risk) 
 
B3.3 Piped water 
 
n) Whether or not the household received piped water from the municipality 
o) If the household chose not to avail themselves of municipal piped water, what their main reason 
was for not getting a connection 
p) If the household received municipal piped water, what connection fees they had paid  
q) Whether or not the household obtained water on the specified days on which the area was 
supplied with water 
 
B4. Households connected to piped water 
 
r) Whether or not households sometimes experienced interruptions in their water supply 
s) If they experienced such interruptions, how often they did so 
t) Whether or not households sometimes stored water they fetched for household use 
u) If they stored such water, what the size of their storage tank was, what price they had paid to 
purchase the tank, and how long it had taken to install  
v) If the household had ever had to rely on emergency sources of water because their stored water 
had been depleted 
w) If they had relied on such emergency sources, how often their supply had been interrupted 
x) The type of meter available (Private in-house, Private in yard, Both private in-house and in-yard, 
Communal, None) 
y) Whether or not the meter worked (Respondents were asked to turn on their tap and check if the 
meter was working) 
z) Whether or not households received water bill 
aa) If households received water bills, what the most recent total of the bill was, how many months it 
covered, and what the volume in m
3
 had been of their consumption 
bb) Whether or not households found the current price of water affordable 
 
B5. Household expenditure to improve the quality of drinking water 
 
cc) Whether or not the household treated or filtered their water in any way before drinking it 
dd) If the household indeed treated or filtered its water, how often they did so and what treatment they 
applied (Boiling only, Filtering only, Boiling and filtering, Addition of chemicals, Straining 
through a cloth, Solar disinfection, Allowing time for sediments to settle) 
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Abstract 
 
In Rwanda, rural water supply is not uniformly distributed. Thus, for domestic water, rural areas are 
characterised by differences in the distance to the nearest water point and in water quality; for 
irrigation water, by watering frequency and water availability; and by the price for both. This means 
that a household’s perception of further improvements in water supply will depend crucially on the 
current situation faced by that particular household. We used a choice experiment method to model 
how the individual status quo (SQ) affects preferences. We found that accounting for individual SQ 
information improves significance of the model relative to simply using the generic SQ parameter in 
the model, and that the willingness to pay increases. Not using this information leads to a downward 
bias – and, in some cases, statistical insignificance – in the estimates of households’ valuation of 
health improvements linked to improved domestic water availability, as well as of increased watering 
frequency linked to the improved availability of irrigation water. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
This paper is about the willingness to pay (WTP) for an improved supply of water for domestic and 
irrigation use in rural areas of Rwanda. For our analysis, we used a choice experiment (CE) in which 
individual status quo (SQ) information was used to improve the model fit. This is interesting to do 
since, from a policy perspective, considering existing individual baseline conditions in the valuation 
study might assist policymakers in responding better to individuals’ real needs – a fact which many 
previous studies have neglected. 
 
Previous studies applying stated preferences have primarily used hypothetical baselines. This was 
mainly because researchers either wanted to know how respondents would react if circumstances 
changed and a new policy were to be introduced, simply as a matter of their own convenience, or in 
order to minimise protest responses for a status quo condition which was controversial (Whittington 
and Adamowicz 2011). However, using hypothetical baseline conditions can cause confusion and 
spread misinformation among the studied population and could also influence the policy process itself 
in unfortunate ways (Whittington 2004). As discussed in Whittington and Adamowicz (2011), for 
example, using a hypothetical baseline render the results of the valuation study less policy-relevant if 
the respondent’s preference and behaviour depends on the current baseline SQ condition rather than 
the state of the world described in the hypothetical baseline. 
 
Following previous criticism, in this paper we used current information about the SQ and observed 
how this performed compared with the results obtained by using hypothetical SQ parameters. 
 
More precisely, this paper aims to investigate whether the individual SQ situation affects preferences 
in terms of improvements in rural water supply. Heterogeneity in current rural water supply is 
especially observed through the price of water, distance to the nearest water point, watering 
frequency, and water availability. These attributes and other socio-economic variables have been 
included in the analysis. 
 
We found that not using the individual status quo information limits the significance of the model in 
both domestic and irrigation water use and, in several cases, leads to downward bias in the sizes of the 
estimated coefficients. In fact, the estimates of both the conditional and mixed (or random parameter) 
logit models show that, in general, individual SQ information allows better results in terms of 
significance in the model. 
 
In Section 2, a short description is given of the rural water supply in Rwanda as a background to the 
study. In Section 3, earlier CE studies, specifically on water valuation, are briefly discussed. In the 
same section, the literature on SQ information in the CE as well as the usefulness of using the SQ 
information is reviewed. Section 4 discusses the modelling issues. Section 5 gives details on the 
interview process, the attributes and attribute levels used in the CE, and the coding used for the 
individual SQ information. Section 6 describes the households’ SQ situation for attributes and the 
respondents’ socio-economic characteristics. Section 7 presents the results of the empirical estimation. 
In Section 8, we briefly conclude our findings. 
 
2. Background 
 
2.1 Domestic water 
 
The domestic water in rural Rwanda is supplied under several management options, with wide 
variations across regions with regard to the quality of water, the price of water, and the distance to the 
nearest water point. At the time of the study in 2012, many households were collecting water from 
unprotected or otherwise unsafe sources. Statistics show that only 0.9% of rural households have 
piped water to their premises (Republic of Rwanda 2012), and that most households rely on other 
2
 alternatives, namely public taps
1
 (30%), tube wells
2
 (19%), protected or unprotected springs
3
 (28%), 
surface water (10%) and others (12%). Households that consume unsafe water are, therefore, exposed 
to worms, dysentery and cholera, all of which are associated with insanitary hygiene (Republic of 
Rwanda 2011). 
 
The average time from a homestead to a drinking water source is estimated to be 29 minutes in the 
rural areas, with disparities through different districts (Republic of Rwanda 2010). The failure of the 
rural water access and delivery system reveals that financing mechanisms are not designed to allow 
revenues from water consumption to help cover supply costs. Thus, in order to improve water supply, 
most rural water consumers would need to pay more, in one way or another. Furthermore, the 
heterogeneous baseline status of access to water coupled with an individual’s personal socio-
economic characteristics might lead to variations in individual preferences for the same improved 
service. If the heterogeneity in current water access is taken into consideration, an optimal policy 
reform would need to take context into account rather than applying a regionally homogeneous 
solution. 
 
2.2 Irrigation water 
 
The uneven distribution of water for irrigation through different parts of the country has become an 
issue. For example, rainfall is high in the west, but low in the east. This situation explains why 
farming during dry seasons is very limited in some places. Furthermore, there is inefficient use of 
water in irrigation throughout the country, given that some households that farm during the dry season 
receive abundant water, while others lack sufficient water to grow crops during the same period. 
Thus, water availability and watering frequency differ among farmers and across regions. 
 
Irrigation schemes in Rwanda can be classified into three broad categories: hillside irrigation 
(characterised by pressurised systems developed on privately owned hillside land, but managed by a 
group of farmers using common irrigation infrastructures); marshland irrigation (state-owned lands 
where farmers are allotted plots on lease and share a common irrigation infrastructure); and small-
scale irrigation (small, privately owned garden plots) (Republic of Rwanda 2010). For each defined 
irrigation scheme, all water users are grouped into what are known as Water Users Associations 
(WUAs).
4
 
 
At present, although there is a comprehensive irrigation development policy in place in Rwanda, 
small-scale informal irrigation – typically on the fringes of marshes – still dominates. Most of these 
arrangements were developed spontaneously with little or no technical outside assistance (Republic of 
Rwanda 2010). 
 
Irrigation water comes mainly from rivers, streams, lakes, rainfall and aquifers. Farmers practising 
small-scale irrigation harvest rainwater in small earth dams with simple drip technologies. 
                                                     
1 A public water point, stand post or kiosk at which people can purchase water. 
2
 A tube well is a deep hole that has been drilled with the purpose of reaching groundwater supplies. 
Water is delivered through a pump, which is powered by human, animal, wind, electric, diesel or solar 
means. In the case of Rwanda, the pump is usually powered by human means. See 
http://www.wssinfo.org/definitions-methods/watsan-categories/, last accessed 6 March 2013. 
3
 Protected springs are typically shielded from run-off, bird droppings and animals by a ‘spring box’ 
constructed of brick, masonry or concrete, and built around the spring so that water flows directly out 
of the box into a pipe or cistern without being exposed to outside pollution. Unprotected springs are 
subject to run-off, bird droppings, or the entry of animals. 
4
 Each such association is endowed with a legal personality in view of the management, enhancement 
and sustainability of the water resource and irrigation scheme. The Ministry of Agriculture and Animal 
Resources transfers responsibility for the operation and maintenance of an irrigation scheme to the 
WUA. The latter, together with the district in which it is located, signs a management transfer 
agreement. See http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/rwa108341.pdf, last accessed 11 July 2013. 
3
  
Given the current heterogeneity in irrigation practices due to differences in access to water, the 
ongoing strategic developments which prioritise the intensification of current production systems by 
mechanised irrigation (Republic of Rwanda 2010) need to incorporate the design of appropriate 
instruments that respond to the specific individual context. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 The choice experiment method 
 
A choice experiment is a quantitative technique for eliciting individual preferences. It allows 
researchers to uncover how people value selected attributes of a programme, product or service by 
asking them to choose among various hypothetical alternatives (Mangham et al. 2009). 
 
Research on the valuation of non-market goods has evolved over the years through the revealed 
preference (RP) and stated preference (SP) methods. The former method assesses the value of non-
market goods by studying actual behaviour on a closely related market, while the second relies on 
individuals’ stated behaviour in a hypothetical setting (Alpízar et al. 2003). The use of RP methods 
proved inefficient when foretelling demand for new services, i.e. in situations where the aim is to find 
out what people would be prepared to pay if a good’s characteristics were to change in the future 
(Vloerbergh et al. 2007). This limitation raised an interest in SP methods, amongst which are the more 
well-known contingent valuation method (CVM) and the CE method used in economic valuation. In 
the CE method, respondents are asked to choose between a set of alternatives with different attributes, 
often including a (hypothetical) baseline alternative with the attributes currently facing an average 
respondent. The CE method constitutes a generalisation of the CVM in that respondents are asked to 
choose between cases described by several different attributes rather than choosing between a base 
case and a specific alternative (Adamowicz et al. 1998). The CE method’s advantage over the CVM is 
that it relies on the representation of the choice situation in using an array of attributes, rather than on 
a specific change in the good or service. Conversely, a problem with the CVM is its reliance on the 
accuracy of the information and the impossibility of changing any errors in the information found 
after the fact (Boxal et al.1996). Furthermore, the CVM produces only one value for an overall change 
in environmental quality, while the CE provides a value for each individual attribute of an 
environmental programme (Poirier and Fleuret 2010). 
 
The CE method, initially developed by Louvière and Hensher (1982) and Louvière and Woodworth 
(1983) on traveller trade-offs, is useful in valuing non-market goods. Choices and the analysis of 
aggregate consumer choice behaviour have been used increasingly in environmental and natural 
resource economics (Bateman et al. 2002). However, application of the CE method is relatively new 
in the field of water resource economics. Young (2005) presents a detailed discussion of conceptual 
issues related to water valuation, such as the use of water as an input to production. He notes (ibid.) 
that, for most goods traded in markets, prices reveal a product’s scarcity via the signals they send; but 
for publicly provided goods and goods with a strong public good component, such as water, clear 
price signals are often lacking; in these cases, indirect valuation methods are needed. Using a series of 
CE methods and mixed logit models for domestic water demand, Hensher et al. (2005) studied WTP 
to avoid interruptions in water service and overflows of waste water, differentiated by the frequency, 
timing and duration of these events in Canberra, Australia. Their findings suggested that both 
frequency and the length of disruption were important attributes for the WTP for a reliable service. 
Willis et al. (2005) used the CE method to estimate WTP for service-level changes in the provision of 
water in the United Kingdom. Using conditional logit, conditional logit quadratic, nested logit and 
nested logit quadratic models, they found that the estimated values were quite similar for each service 
factor across models. Hanley et al. (2006) analysed the values that respondents placed on 
improvements to watercourses and tested the ability of the CE method for benefits transfer across two 
similar rivers. Attributes such as River ecology, representing aquatic life; Aesthetics, representing the 
amount of litter in the river; and Quality of banksides were selected. The results showed that people 
4
 placed insignificantly different values on these three aspects, but that preferences and values differed 
significantly across samples. 
 
For developing countries, there are very few studies using the CE method to analyse households’ 
WTP for improved domestic water services. In their study, Tarfasa and Brouwer (2013) use the CE 
method to elicit households’ WTP for improved water supply services in an urban area in Ethiopia. 
Their findings showed that, despite significant income constraints, households were willing to pay up 
to 80% extra for improved levels of water supply over and above their current water bill. Furthermore, 
women and poor households with the lowest service levels attributed a higher value to the improved 
water supply services. 
 
Regarding water for irrigation, few studies so far have been made using the CE method. One was by 
Peterson et al. (2007), who designed and implemented a series of CEs to elicit the water quality 
trading behaviour of Great Plains crop producers in different situations. As attributes, the CE included 
market rules and features that might affect farmers’ willingness to trade. Using the mixed logit model, 
the study found diversity in the way that the selected attributes affected farmers’ choices. In another 
study, Rigby et al. (2010) examined the economic value of irrigation water to horticultural producers 
in southern Spain using a CE. Through the mixed logit model, findings revealed heterogeneity in the 
WTP values. Farm size was also found to affect WTP, with those managing larger holdings willing to 
pay substantially more for water. A study by Brebbia et al. (2010) elicited the most preferred water 
pricing method under different water rights, water prices and local irrigation water governance 
contexts in India. The results showed that, under conditions of improved water rights, there was an 
increase in the preference for volumetric pricing, while this preference decreased with the presence of 
a water user association. Furthermore, making the right combination of water demand management 
tools helped to increase WTP for an improved supply scenario. In India, Chellattan et al. (2011) 
applied the CE method to investigate farmers’ preferences for and the efficiency of a given pricing 
method based on WTP estimates. Their findings revealed that farmers did not prefer the existing 
pricing system to any of the proposed alternative pricing systems, and that the volumetric-based 
pricing methods would probably be the most acceptable solution. 
 
Up to now, researchers in CE have often used hypothetical baseline scenarios without considering 
their impacts on a respondent’s welfare. However, Barton and Bergland (2010), studying the WTP for 
irrigation water among farmers in Bangladesh, found it useful to consider the individual SQ 
information in their model in that it helped improve the model significance. In their study, farmers 
were asked to choose between two alternative situations: one entailed an improved irrigation water 
supply at different charges, while the other entailed their existing situation, where water supply and 
water tax were as the individual farmers were already paying. The authors found that including 
farmers’ current situation affected their estimated preferences for hypothetical water regimes and 
irrigation prices. 
 
3.2 Individual SQ information 
 
The current study also uses the CE technique, but in line with the Barton and Bergland (2010) study 
discussed above, we emphasise the impact of including individual SQ information on the WTP for 
new hypothetical alternatives. According to Barton and Bergland (ibid.), this method might help to 
better understand the SQ effect, and may capture otherwise unobserved heterogeneity, by virtue of 
which the potential limitation encountered by the CE modelling could be addressed. 
 
A series of decision-making experiments showed that, when people are faced with different choices, 
they have a strong tendency to prefer that things remain unchanged (Meyerhoff and Liebe 2009). This 
behaviour, referred to as SQ bias, was first demonstrated by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988).
5
 
                                                     
5
 The authors define the SQ option as a decision to do nothing or to maintain one’s current or previous 
situation. 
5
  
CE studies have generally avoided using SQ information because individuals’ preferences for SQ 
choices have been considered as a psychologically based deviation from rational choice. Thus, the use 
of SQ information has been quoted as a factor that might induce a so-called SQ effect (i.e. the 
equivalent of an SQ bias) relative to rational consumer behaviour towards and away from the SQ 
alternatives (Barton and Bergland 2010). According to Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), this SQ 
bias may be classified into three categories: (1) rational decision-making in the presence of transition 
costs and/or uncertainty;
6
 (2) cognitive misperceptions;
7
 and (3) psychological commitment stemming 
from misperceived sunk costs,
8
 regret avoidance, or a drive consistency.
9
 However, for demand 
prediction and in order to estimate the welfare change associated with policy proposals, the use of SQ 
information may be essential. Furthermore, the inclusion of SQ information means that respondents 
are not forced to choose only between hypothetical alternatives they might not actually want. 
 
In general, SQ information used in the CE literature has been principally fixed and hypothetical, with 
no change in attributes across respondents. According to Barton and Bergland (2010), however, the 
simplification to a common SQ becomes problematic in the CE scenario when the actual SQ situation 
facing respondents is sufficiently variable. In their study, Barton and Bergland (ibid.) considered that, 
since irrigation water was a rival in consumption and was a common pool resource, every farmer had 
a different SQ water availability scenario, depending on his/her farm’s location in the network of 
irrigation channels. It is the same with the current study: we noticed a large variation among farmers 
in respect of irrigation frequency, water availability, and payment for water used. For domestic water 
use, the wide variability across households is observed particularly keenly through the frequency of 
contacting waterborne diseases, through distance from the nearest water point, and through the cost of 
water. Thus, the use of individual SQ information is likely to be suitable for both domestic and 
irrigation water use for the present study as well. 
 
For modelling issues, the SQ effect has been dealt with by applying the conditional logit model 
together with an alternative-specific constant (ASC), as discussed further in Section 4, or by applying 
the nested logit model – given that the first model helps to address systematic SQ effects, and the 
second the correlation across utilities of designed alternatives. As for the mixed logit model 
specification, both types of effects are flexibly and simultaneously addressed by inducing a 
correlation pattern in the utility of alternatives, and by capturing a systematic effect due to the SQ in 
the indirect utility (Scarpa et al. 2005). However, according to Banzhaf et al. (2002), including the 
individual characteristics of each respondent’s opt-out alternative is more informative than including 
an interaction term between an ASC and respondents’ characteristics. Furthermore, Barton and 
Bergland (2010) could not include an ASC for the SQ level, since it is highly correlated with the 
individual SQ attribute levels. Therefore, the present study is similar to that of Barton and Bergland 
(ibid.), but with an application to both irrigation and domestic water use. 
 
For both irrigation and domestic water use, households in our study were requested to choose between 
two new alternatives for improved water supply at different prices and other attribute levels on the 
one hand, and a current situation in which water supply reflected the SQ level as reported by the 
household, on the other. 
 
4. Model development 
 
                                                     
6
 The individual’s initial choice affects his/her preferences in the subsequent decision, and any switch 
from the SQ can be costly. 
7
 Individuals weigh losses more heavily than gains in making their decisions. 
8
 The larger the past resource investment in a decision, the greater the inclination to continue the 
commitment in subsequent decisions. 
9
 Past choices are rationalised, and the rationalisation process extends to current and future choices. 
 
6
 The choice analysis has often been described as a way of explaining variations in the behaviour of a 
sample of individuals – which is the key focus of the CE. In particular, recent research has 
emphasised the recognition of variance in utility over different choice situations (Greene and Hensher 
2010). The next crucial point has been to find an appropriate model to help determine the influences 
that heterogeneity has on choice-making. In recent years, research has focused on how best to model 
that heterogeneity; rapid progress has recently been made in modelling heterogeneity in the CE. 
 
4.1 Conditional and mixed logit models 
 
The most common starting point in CE modelling is the conditional logit model, where a choice 
among alternatives is treated as a function of the characteristics of those alternatives (McFadden 
1974). The conditional and mixed logit models have been popular in modelling qualitative choice 
behaviour. According to McFadden (ibid.), approximation is reasonably good with the conditional 
logit model – even in small samples. However, the main concern about the latter model is its 
assumption of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA).
10
 Furthermore, with the conditional 
logit model, there is an assumption that disturbances are independent and homoscedastic. This 
assumption may be too restrictive, especially when the number of alternatives in the choice set is 
large. 
 
The mixed logit model allows the parameter associated with each observed variable to vary randomly 
across individuals, and avoids the IIA assumption (Revelt and Train 1998). Furthermore, the mixed 
logit considers that unobserved individual-specific information can be used to induce correlation 
across alternatives, and changes among individuals. According to Carlsson et al. (2003), although the 
mixed logit models are less restrictive than their conditional counterparts, they are more difficult to 
estimate and the results can be heavily influenced by the distributional assumptions. In fact, the 
distributions of the selected random parameters can take a number of functional forms (e.g. normal, 
triangular, uniform and log-normal) and, due to the bias that could exist in real data, determining the 
true distribution empirically is challenging. 
 
Considering, then, the advantages and disadvantages for the conditional logit and RPL models, we 
have reported both estimates for comparison purposes. 
 
Considering the random utility framework, individuals choose – from the choice set – the alternative 
that maximises their utility. 
 
Then the utility   obtained from, say, alternative   for individual   in choice situation t is – 
 
                (1) 
 
where      represents the deterministic part and      the stochastic or random component. 
 
Since the stochastic part of the utility is unknown to the researcher, the best s/he can do is predict the 
final outcome in terms of probability. The probability that alternative    rather than alternative    is 
chosen from the choice set   by individual   is given as follows: 
 
         (         ) 
      (                   ) 
      ((         )  (         )) (2) 
                    
 
                                                     
10 The assumption that the probability ratio of choosing between two alternatives does not depend on the 
availability or attributes of the other alternatives. 
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 A probability density function must be imposed on      in order to be able to solve equation (2) with 
an appropriate discrete choice model. 
 
4.2 The conditional logit models 
 
The conditional logit models are appropriate when the choice among alternatives is modelled as a 
function of the characteristics of the alternatives, rather than as a function of the characteristics of the 
individual making the choice (Hoffman and Duncan 1988). 
 
The conditional logit model assumes that the error term   is independent and identically Gumbel-
distributed,
11
 (extreme value type I).The basic set-up is equation (1), –  
 
                
               (3) 
 
where      is a vector of observed attributes of an alternative within a choice set; and   is the vector 
of coefficients of these attributes, and is constant across choices for the conditional logit model. Then, 
when choice   is made, the probability   that household   will select alternative   can be represented 
as follows: 
 
      
   (      )
∑    (     )    
 (4) 
 
In case the deterministic part is specified by including a constant, we have –  
 
                 (5) 
 
where     is an ASC for individual   and   alternatives (       ).The ASC captures the average 
effect on utility of all factors that are not included in the model. 
 
In order to capture possible preference heterogeneity, we can include the observable socio-economic 
characteristics in the systematic part of equation (5). However, such characteristics cannot be added to 
the model directly, given that they are constant across alternatives. We then allow them to interact 
with the ASC. From equation (5), we thus have –  
 
                          (6) 
 
where    is a vector of socio-economic characteristics;    is a vector of coefficients associated with 
individual characteristics; and      is a vector of systematic parameters responsible for individuals’ 
characteristics. Thus, systematic preference heterogeneity is captured as a function of individuals’ 
characteristics. 
 
4.3 The RPL models 
 
The RPL models help to analyse how the characteristics of household   and those of choice   affect 
the probability that the household will choose alternative  . As in the conditional logit, the RPL 
models assume the error terms      are independent and identically Gumbel-distributed, but the vector 
coefficient   might vary across individuals due to preference heterogeneity. Consider the utility 
function in equation (3): 
  
                                                     
11 Their cumulative and density functions are, respectively,  ( )       (    )      ( )       (   
   ). 
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The RPL is similar to a conditional logit model, except that it allows parameter estimates to vary 
across individuals. In the RPL models, the individual’s utility is then – 
 
                  (7) 
 
where   now differs across individuals. 
 
The assumption regarding independent and identical Gumbel-distribution is restrictive in the sense 
that it does not allow for the error components of different alternatives to be correlated (Hensher and 
Greene 2003).However, the information contained in      could be sufficient to induce correlation 
across the alternatives. By breaking this assumption of non-correlation on      , the RPL partitions the 
stochastic component additively into two terms, where one term is correlated over alternatives and 
heteroscedasticity, and another part is independent and identically Gumbel-distributed over 
alternatives and individuals. Thus, we have – 
 
                  ́  (8) 
 
where     is an additional random term that models the presence of correlation, and   ́ is a random 
term with zero mean that is independent and identically Gumbel-distributed over alternatives and 
individuals. According to Hensher and Greene (ibid.),     can take on a number of distributional 
forms such as normal, log-normal, or triangular. We denote the density   (     
 ) where    denotes 
the (true) parameters of this distribution. For a given value of     , the conditional probability that a 
person   chooses alternative   in period   is logit, since the remaining error term is identically 
Gumbel-distributed: 
 
    (   )  
   (          )
∑        (          )
 (9) 
 
When   is not fixed and      not given, then the unconditional probability of household   choosing 
alternative   is the integral of the conditional probability,  over all possible values of     and weighted 
by the density of     expressed as follows: 
 
      ∫    (   )  (     
 )     (10) 
 
Within this form, the utility coefficients vary among individuals, but are constants among the choice 
situations for each individual (Carlsson et al. 2003). Furthermore, exact maximum likelihood 
estimation is not possible, given that the integral in equation (10) cannot be calculated analytically. 
Instead, an approximation of the probability method through simulation is appropriate. Using the 
Halton draws, a simulated maximum likelihood will be used to estimate the models. 
 
In fact, although unobserved heterogeneity can be accounted for in the RPL, adding the interaction 
term helps to explain the source of heterogeneity (Boxal and Adamowicz 2002). Equation 8 has, thus, 
been used to allow attributes to interact with some socio-economic characteristics affecting the choice 
of the SQ. Then we have the following: 
 
                       ́  (11) 
 
Furthermore, following the same logic as we had with the conditional logit, we can consider a case 
where the deterministic part of the equation is specified by including an alternative specific constant 
in the RPL. Equation (11) then becomes – 
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                            ́  (12) 
 
As in the conditional logit, we have included the socio-economic characteristics in the systematic part 
of equation (12) by allowing them to interact with the ASC. 
 
In short, equations (6) and (12) have been used for models without SQ information. In these models, 
we included the ASC and allowed it to interact with the individual respondents’ socio-economic 
characteristics. 
 
Equation (8) has been used for RPL models with individual SQ information. In these models, we have 
excluded both the ASC and socio-economic characteristics. In fact, according to Barton and Bergland 
(2010), including the alternative specific constant in such models could lead to inflated standard errors 
of coefficients (ibid.). 
 
For comparison purposes, in models with individual SQ information, we included the interaction 
terms between attributes and socio-economic characteristics. Equation (11) was used for such a 
comparison. 
 
Furthermore, based on the real data at our disposal, we tested both normal and log-normal 
distributions in the RPL. Details of these results are given in Appendix B. 
 
4.4 Willingness to pay 
 
The main purpose of the CE method is to determine the individual’s WTP for a unit-level change of a 
given attribute. This is the marginal value of change in an attribute. The marginal WTP (MWTP) for 
unit-level change is then the ratio between the parameter of the attribute and the parameter of the cost 
(Louvière et al. 2000). If, in this case, we separate the systematic part of the utility into cost and non-
cost attributes, we obtain the following: 
 
  (   )    ∑           (13) 
 
where ∑       represents the marginal utility for   different attributes;   (     ) in our case, and 
    is the marginal utility of the cost attribute. By differentiating equation (10) and considering the 
utility as fixed, the MWTP can be expressed as follows: 
 
      
  
  
 (14) 
 
In our case, we allow for heterogeneity in the definition of the status quo level for each respondent, 
the purpose of which is to estimate how this heterogeneous SQ affects WTP. 
 
Individual characteristics were also included in the models as fixed coefficients. These coefficients 
were allowed to interact with alternative specific intercepts in models without individual SQ 
information. Furthermore, also for models without individual SQ information, we included one 
common ASC for hypothetical alternatives. However, for models with individual SQ information, we 
could not include an ASC. 
 
5. Data collection 
 
From 8 August to 8 September 2012, we conducted a survey in 13 out of 30 districts that comprise the 
country of Rwanda. For the sampling method, we first clustered the population into the country’s four 
provinces, excluding the capital city, since the targeted population was that living in rural areas. 
10
 Consequently, considering a total population of 4,373,100
12
 in all 13 districts, an average household 
size of 4.3 in rural areas and a sampling fraction of 1:1000, we randomly sampled 1,017 households. 
Thus, with simple random sampling, we selected 3 or 4 districts in each province to have a total of 13 
districts. In each district, we randomly selected 3 sectors,
13
 giving us 39 sectors in total. In 36 of these 
sectors, we randomly selected 26 households; and in the 3 remaining sectors, we randomly selected 27 
households.
14
 Due to the time constraint and given that the study covered areas scattered in different 
rural parts of the country, the data collection was undertaken by a team of 9 enumerators. Using the 
random walk method, we chose the sector headquarter as the starting point and begin walking from 
that point to the closest household
15
 for the first interview. If no one was at home (i.e. the premises 
were empty), we substituted with the very next household. If the interview was refused, we used an 
interval of 10 to select a substitute household, counting houses on both the right- and the left-hand 
sides. 
 
The survey addressed rural water supply (domestic and irrigation), and the respondents were the local 
inhabitants. The head of a household was targeted for responding to the questionnaire, but other adults 
were considered where the head was not available. 
 
The questionnaire was divided into two parts. The first contained questions on respondents’ socio-
economic characteristics, while the second contained questions for the CE. Regarding the latter, 
enumerators first explained the questionnaire as well as the logic of the game, and respondents were 
asked to read the questionnaire carefully in turn and to make their choice among various alternatives. 
However, the enumerator had to make sure that the respondent was able to read and write; otherwise, 
s/he had to fill in the questionnaire according to the answers given by the respondent. 
 
There were two different CEs: one on domestic water use, and the other on irrigation. We had the 
same questionnaire for everyone up to the point where the CE started. With the CE, participants 
responded either to the CE related to domestic water use, or to the one concerning water for irrigation. 
 
In order to avoid a sample selection problem in the CE, we could not split respondents based on 
whether they carried out agriculture or not. Instead, we ran the CE on a rotational basis. Thus, we ran 
the CE on domestic water with the first, third, and fifth respondent in the village concerned; and 
accordingly ran the CE for irrigation water with the second, fourth, and sixth respondent in that 
location. However, for the CE for irrigation water, the rotational order sometimes could not be 
respected, given that some households did not irrigate. In such cases, we automatically switched to the 
CE on domestic water and instead used the CE on irrigation for the next household to be interviewed. 
Those who responded to the CE for domestic water numbered 785, and those for irrigation water, 232. 
 
5.1 Attributes and attribute levels in the CE 
 
A pilot study was carried out in order to allow us to define attributes and attribute levels, which were 
then used in the main survey. The pilot was run in 5 districts and 50 households, i.e. 10 in each 
district. Participants were then randomly selected. 
 
Broadly speaking, we learned from the pilot that majority of households lack piped water into their 
houses, and used unsafe non-tap sources as a result. There was a high incidence of diarrhoea 
infections (about three cases per household member per year) due to unsafe water. On average, 
household members walked between a minimum of 1 km and a maximum of 3 km to fetch water from 
                                                     
12 See http://statistics.gov.rw/search/node/EICV, last accessed 6 March 2013. 
13 The sector is a third-level administrative subdivision in Rwanda after the province and district levels. 
14
 The three sectors belong to a district called Nyagatare, qualified as being the largest and second most 
populous district in Rwanda. 
15
 If two households are at approximately the same distance from the starting point, a coin was flipped to 
decide between them.  
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 the nearest water point. From these findings, we understood that health effects and distance to water 
sources would be relevant attributes for any policy reform. Due to the very limited access to domestic 
water, which, in turn, bears with it a high risk of infectious diseases, we assumed that households 
would be positive to policy reforms that could help them to get better-quality water. Under different 
tariff schedules, the new service could either help to alleviate the problem with the current unreliable 
service, or could solve the problem completely. There were scenarios in which the set of attributes as 
well as the price varied; where only two incidences of infectious diseases per household member 
occurred per year; and where no such incidences occurred. For the distance to the water point, the 
scenarios entailed distances of either 50 m or 20 m. 
 
Regarding water for irrigation, information from the pilot showed that the practice of irrigation was 
very new in the country, and that, so far, not many farmers irrigated their crops. Those who did so 
usually employed irrigation on a small scale only: rainfall dams remained the most popular method of 
watering crops. Farmers generally do not pay for water used; those that do, usually pay a fixed 
amount for each season, but the amount is not related to the quantity of water used. Water is 
insufficient, however: the dry season typically lasts six months, but on average the irrigation water 
only lasts for two months. The watering frequency is three times a month on average during the time 
when water is available. Farmers manifested a high WTP for reform that might bring about an 
increased availability of water and watering frequency. Considering their current situation, we thus 
assumed two new alternatives, varying in different scenarios. Under different price schedules, the 
water availability in the previously described scenarios would last for either five or six months, while 
watering frequency would be either six or eight times per month. 
 
5.2 Coding the individual SQ information 
 
Given that the pilot study showed a considerable heterogeneity in respondents’ SQs, we found it 
useful to code the SQ alternative as specified by each respondent rather than devise a fixed or 
invariant code across respondents. In order to put the individual SQ information and the experimental 
design levels on the same attribute scale, we used interval coding for the individual SQ level. Thus, 
for domestic water, through three defined attributes – Long-term health effect, Reduced distance to 
water point and Price – Table 1 shows farmers’ responses to the choice between two experimentally 
hypothetical scenarios and the SQ alternative they had described. For irrigation water, farmers were 
asked to make a choice between two hypothetical alternatives and their existing alternative with three 
attributes, namely Water availability, Watering frequency, and Semi-volumetric water pricing.
16
 
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
Before the CE began, we first briefly introduced the purpose of the experiment by reminding 
respondents about the current rural water devolution policy. We also reminded them of their current 
status related to the unreliable water supply used in both the domestic sphere and in agriculture. From 
their current situation, we gave detailed explanations of the hypothetical attribute levels by informing 
them that the improved service required a price reform, i.e. that improved water provision would be 
costly, and that part of the cost would be passed on in the form of higher prices. These explanations as 
well as examples of the attributes and attribute levels are given in Appendix A. 
 
With a total of six choice
17
 sets divided into two blocks, each respondent responded to three choice 
situations on a rotational basis in the experiment. Each choice contained two new hypothetical 
                                                     
16 We calculated the annual semi-volumetric water price (RWF/ha/watering) as the product of the number 
of watering events per month and the months of available water in the scenario. Farmers could then 
compare this new hypothetical price with the existing seasonal tax paid. 
17
 With the FACTEX procedure in SAS software, we generated a complete factorial experiment (eight 
runs) with three factors, each at two levels. 
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 alternatives for an improved water supply as well as the option to choose the existing situation as they 
had described it. 
 
6. Descriptive statistics 
 
6.1 Household’s SQ for attributes 
 
Table 2 describes the households’ situation at the time of the survey in terms of domestic and 
irrigation water use. For domestic water use, statistics from the survey showed that only 1% of the 
sample was connected to piped water.
18
 The majority of households (99%) in the sample relied on 
different types of non-tap water sources (public tap, tube well, unprotected springs, surface water, 
etc.), with some variations regarding distance to the nearest source. Overall, the average distance to 
non-tap sources was about 922 m, and the average unit cost of water approximately RWF 282
19
 per 
cubic metre. On average, a household member contracted infectious diarrhoea three times a year. 
 
Regarding water for irrigation, the statistics showed that the frequency of irrigation was twice a month 
on average, and water was available on an average of two months during the dry season. The average 
overall payment for irrigation was estimated at RWF 855 per season.
20
 
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
From Figure 1, we can observe a large variation in current access to water for domestic and irrigation 
use. The distance to the nearest water point varies between 401 m and 3,000 m and only 1% walks 
less than 500 m. Furthermore, the majority of non-connected households (about 63%) obtain water at 
no monetary cost.
21
 For 8% of households, the unit price is RWF 0–250/m3, 7% pay RWF 250–
500/m
3
, 6% pay RWF 500–750/m3, 10% pay RWF 750–1,000/m3, 2% pay RWF 1,000–1,500/m3, etc. 
As regards the number of cases of infectious diarrhoea reported for 2011, only 3% declared that no 
one in their household had experienced it at all; 4% had contracted it just once, and 27% twice. In 
56% of cases, it had occurred three times in one household; 5% had experienced it four times; 2% had 
contracted it five times during the year, and 3% had done so six times. Figure 1 also shows a large 
variation in the irrigation frequency (0–6 times a month) and in water availability (0–3 months during 
the dry season). Regarding payment for irrigation, the amounts vary in the range of RWF 0–4,620 per 
season, with an average of RWF 1,250; the latter figure translates into RWF 250/ha/month. However, 
59% do not pay for water to irrigate their crops. 
 
Thus, the status quo varies dramatically for several of the variables in both domestic and irrigation 
water. It can be misleading, therefore, to assume that everyone has the same status quo.  
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
Figure 1 showed again that for domestic water, the distributions for number of diarrhoeal infections 
per household member per year look symmetric about the mean. According to the descriptive 
statistics in Table 3, the sample mean for the number of diarrhoeal infections per household member 
per year equal to 2.8, the median equal to 3 and the mode equal to 3 are close. This allows us to 
assume that the number of diarrhoeal infections per household member per year might be normally 
                                                     
18 Households with a piped connection are not included in the analysis. 
19
 At the time of the survey, 1 RWF = 0.0016528926 USD; see 
http://www.xe.com/currencytables/?from=RWF&date, last accessed 8 August 2012. 
20
 The season for irrigation in marshlands is from June to October in Rwanda. The price for irrigation is a 
kind of lump sum tax that farmers need to pay to the district authorities each season. 
21
 For the few households that have piped water to their promises, there is heterogeneity in the unit price 
(RWF/m
3
). This can be because rural water is supplied using several management options in each 
district. 
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 distributed, but that the distance to the nearest water point and the price of non-tap water are assumed 
to be log-normally distributed. For irrigation water, the mean (2.4), the median (2.4) and the mode 
(2.5) are close, which allows us to assume a normal distribution for this attribute and a log-normal 
distribution for Water availability and Price (irrigation) attributes. 
 
<Table 3 about here> 
 
6.2 Respondents’ socio-economic characteristics 
 
From the descriptive statistics in Table 4, we can see that respondents were aged between 19 and 79 
years, but had an average age of 40. Half the respondents were men, and half were women. Some 
70% could read and write, and had an average number of four years of schooling. The average 
monthly household income was RWF 17,185. Regarding the WTP for improved service in water 
supply, we found that over 90% of respondents desired improved water for domestic use even if they 
would have to pay more, while 26% of them preferred the SQ for irrigation water. The average size of 
the household was five persons. 
 
<Table 4 about here> 
 
7. Results 
 
With a simple logit model, we tried to estimate the probability of selecting the SQ based on some of 
the respondents’ characteristics described in Table 5. Our results show that, in domestic water use, 
older respondents were more likely to choose the SQ. The more educated the respondent were, the 
less s/he preferred the existing situation. Male respondents were more likely to choose the SQ for both 
domestic and irrigation water. Households with a higher income were slightly less likely to choose the 
SQ alternative ceteris paribus. Being a member of the WUA increased the likelihood of preferring the 
SQ for irrigation water. 
 
<Table 5 about here> 
 
We estimated both conditional logit and RPL models using Limdep software. For the RPL model, we 
simulated the maximum likelihood by using Halton draws with 50 replications. We compared the 
models without individual SQ information with a model that uses this information. Furthermore, we 
allowed the price variable to be fixed and not randomly distributed, while other attributes were 
randomly distributed. Individual characteristics were also included in the models as fixed coefficients 
and the latter were allowed to be interacted either with alternative specific intercepts in models 
without individual SQ information, or with attributes in models with such information. The results of 
all these estimations are presented in Tables 6 and 7. 
 
For domestic water, equations 6 and 12 were used to compare the conditional logit and the RPL 
models without individual SQ information. The results show that the mean coefficients for distance 
and health effect attributes are positive, revealing that respondents preferred these attributes. These 
results are presented in Table 6. 
 
In respect of the socio-economic variables, educated respondents were more likely to choose the 
improved service. However, male respondents were less likely to choose improved services. 
Nonetheless, the latter variable is only significant in the RPL models. Older respondents were also 
less likely to choose the improved service, while respondents with higher incomes were more likely to 
choose the proposed new service. 
 
In brief, comparing results from the conditional logit and the RPL models without individual SQ 
information, we can see that the intercept is statistically significant and positive for the RPL alone. 
The significance of the intercept implies that the new alternatives are, on average, preferred to the SQ 
alternative. Furthermore, comparing both models without SQ information shows that the significance 
14
 of the coefficients in general is improved in the RPL model, which allowed us to use the RPL in the 
rest of the estimations. 
 
If one now compares the results from both RPL models, i.e. those with individual SQ information and 
those without such information (equations 8 and 12), we can see that the significance of the 
coefficients is increased in the RPL models with individual SQ information. Furthermore, in the RPL 
models with individual SQ information, the significance of the estimated standard deviation is a sign 
of heterogeneity in respondent preferences. 
 
Furthermore, using the interaction terms in the RPL model with individual SQ information, results 
show that, in general, respondents with higher levels of education were likely to prefer a water supply 
scenario with a higher level of health benefits and reduced distance to the water point. Thus, the 
preference for each attribute varies across different levels of education. 
 
Brief, precedent results allow us conclude that using the RPL model with individual SQ information is 
more useful because it offers a better model of household behaviour, and allows us to estimate 
attribute coefficients more accurately. 
 
<Table 6 about here> 
 
For irrigation water use, using equation 6 and 12 to compare the conditional logit and the RPL models 
without individual SQ information, the results in Table 7 show a positive sign on both improved 
watering frequency and improved water availability attributes in the RPL models, which means it is 
more likely that respondents do not prefer the existing watering frequency and water availability. 
 
Regarding the socio-economic characteristics, educated respondents were more likely to choose the 
improved irrigation service, while males were less likely to choose it. The latter variable was not 
significant, however. Furthermore, being a WUA member decreased the likelihood of choosing a new 
hypothetical water service in irrigating. This variable was only significant with the RPL model. Older 
respondents were less likely to choose the new service, while respondents with higher incomes 
preferred the proposed new service. 
 
To summarise, we can first say that, by comparing the results from the conditional logit and the RPL 
models without individual SQ information, we see that intercepts are positively significant for both 
the conditional logit and the RPL. This implies that, on average, the new alternatives were preferred to 
the SQ alternative. Then, comparing both models without SQ information, we can observe the 
significance of the coefficients was improved in general when the RPL model was used. This allows 
one to use the RPL in the rest of the analysis. 
 
When results from both RPL models, i.e. those with individual SQ information and those without 
such information (equations 8 and 12) are compared, we observe that the significance of the 
coefficients increased in the RPL models with individual SQ information. Furthermore, the 
significance of the estimated standard deviations in the RPL models with individual SQ information 
revealed heterogeneity in respondent preferences. 
 
If one includes interaction terms in the RPL model with individual SQ information (equation 11), the 
results show that respondents with higher levels of education were more likely to prefer an irrigation 
water supply scenario with higher levels of frequency. Furthermore, the interaction between watering 
frequency and WUA membership was negative. This result is similar to that found by Barton and 
Bergland (2010) in Bangladesh. 
 
From all these results, we concluded that using the RPL model with individual SQ information might 
be more useful than that using the said model without such information, given that the significance of 
the coefficients increases with the RPL, and the coefficients themselves are larger. 
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 <Table 7 about here> 
 
Our main interest lies in comparing the MWTP for a model without individual SQ with one that 
includes such information. Using the normal distribution for both domestic and irrigation water use, 
the results in Tables 8 and 9 show that a large difference in MWTP when it comes to the RPL without 
individual SQ information and the RPL model with such information. This is probably due to the fact 
that there is strong heterogeneity in the current situation; and this SQ situation might induce a strong 
heterogeneity in preferences. 
 
Furthermore, comparing both RPL models, i.e. without and with individual SQ information, we found 
an increase in the size and significance of coefficients in the RPL model with individual SQ 
information for both irrigation and domestic water use. 
 
Comparing the RPL without individual SQ information with the RPL with such information, we can 
see that, for domestic water use (Table 8), the MWTP for having water within a maximum distance of 
50 m from the household is valued at 0.58% of average household income when SQ information is 
not taken into account, but at 1.08% of such average income when it is. In addition, one less case of 
diarrhoea per household member per year was valued at 1.93% of household income when the SQ is 
not taken into account, but at 3.95% when it was. For irrigation water, comparing the RPL model 
without individual SQ information and that with such information, we found – as the results in Table 
9 reveal – that the MWTP for watering crops at least six times per month rather than twice per month 
was estimated at 0.25% of household total income when SQ information was not used, and at 1.05% 
when it was. The MWTP for having water for five rather than two months of the dry season was 
valued at 1.14% of household total income without SQ information, and 2.24% with such 
information. 
 
We also noted that, if the SQ information were included in both domestic and irrigation water cases, 
the MWTP was at least twice as high as when SQ information was excluded. 
 
In brief, using MWTP for the normal distributed coefficients results shows that, in general, the 
watering frequency and water availability attributes increase the average utility derived from an 
improved irrigation water service. In addition, long-run health effect improvements and reduced 
distance to a water point would, in turn, improve the average utility derived from an improved 
domestic water service. Households do not, in general, prefer the existing services in domestic or 
irrigation water. In fact, according to Whittington et al. (1990), it is commonly assumed that, as long 
as the cost does not exceed 5% of income, rural households might prefer to abandon their existing 
water supply in favour of the hypothetically improved system. 
 
<Tables 8 and 9 about here> 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The CE method has been used to evaluate how heterogeneity in a household’s existing rural water use 
affected their preferences for a hypothetically improved situation. From basic statistics, 26% of 
respondents preferred the existing irrigation water supply system to a proposed new one. The likely 
reason might be that, with the current system, 61% of respondents did not pay for water used, but still 
practised some irrigation. However, for domestic water use, although 65% obtained water free of 
charge, in general they were not satisfied with the existing situation. In fact, only 10% preferred the 
existing system to remain, while the rest were willing to pay for improved water. Considering how 
households not connected to the piped network system were aware of their vulnerability, as 
manifested by the high frequency of water-borne diseases among their members, one can understand 
why the majority (90%) opted for change. In fact, if one compares the levels of satisfaction with the 
SQ for domestic and irrigation water, respectively, households were relatively satisfied with the 
existing irrigation system, but not at all satisfied with the existing domestic water supply. One could 
16
 also say that, in both cases, the majority of households were not satisfied with the existing systems, 
but were even more discontented with the existing domestic water supply system. 
 
If one considers the broad heterogeneity in the existing situation, the use of information on individual 
respondents was of great importance. 
 
Comparing the conditional logit and the RPL models without individual SQ information, we saw that 
the proposed new alternatives were preferred, on average, to the SQ alternative for both domestic and 
irrigation water, and that the significance of the coefficients was generally improved in the RPL 
model. This revealed heterogeneous preferences for the attributes concerned. 
 
Using the RPL models with individual SQ information, we found an increase in the significance of 
coefficients for both irrigation and domestic water use, compared with the results obtained when we 
used the RPL without individual SQ information. 
 
For the MWTP, coefficients were larger and had higher statistical significance in models with 
individual SQ information than in those without such information. Furthermore, the overall situation 
showed that attributes in the CE increased the utility derived from an improved service, which means 
that, in general, respondents were willing to pay for new improved service. However, in terms of 
household’s total income, the higher MWTP was obtained from models with individual SQ 
information rather than with models lacking such information. 
 
From a policy perspective, not accounting for individual SQ information meant that an overall policy 
change might be undertaken without considering individual cases. If one refers to the results from the 
present study, not considering individual SQ information might work since the majority opted for the 
change. However, if one considers how the inclusion of individual SQ information affected the results 
through increased coefficient magnitude, there is a risk that, if SQ information is not used, the MWTP 
might be underestimated, which might discourage policymakers from designing appropriate improved 
services that respond to the real needs of the population. Care needs to be taken: both to ensure that 
changes in water provision do not worsen conditions for households with a favourable SQ, and so that 
changes in water provision that will improve conditions for households with an unfavourable SQ are 
in fact carried out. Thus, taking the heterogeneity in the existing situation into account in policy is 
important, both for those who have a favourable SQ situation and those who do not. 
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Fig. 1 Respondents’ SQ, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
 
2
0
 
4
0
 
6
0
 
P
er
 c
en
t 
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 
Amount paid by household in 2011 
 
0
 
2
0
 
4
0
 
6
0
 
8
0
 
P
er
 c
en
t 
0 1 2 3 
Number of months water is available in the dry season 
0
 
1
0
 
2
0
 
3
0
 
4
0
 
P
er
 c
en
t 
0 2 4 6 
Irrigation frequency per month  
0
 
2
0
 
4
0
 
6
0
 
P
er
 c
en
t 
0 2 4 6 
Number of diarrhoeal infections per household member per year 
 
0
 
2
0
 
4
0
 
6
0
 
P
er
 c
en
t 
0 500 1,000 1,500 
Unit price (RWF/cubic metre) for non-tap water 
0
 
1
0
 
2
0
 
3
0
 
P
er
 c
en
t 
500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 
Distance to the nearest source (in metres) 
20
  
Table 1 Attributes and attribute levels – Domestic and irrigation water 
Attributes Attribute levels in experimental 
design 
Individuals’ status quo levels 
Domestic water   
Long-term health 
effect  
0 cases of diarrhoeal infection 
2 cases 
 
0 cases 
[0–2] cases 
[2–4] cases 
[4–6] cases 
[6–8] cases (Reference level) 
 
Reduced distance to 
water point 
 
20 m 
40 m 
 
[0–20] m 
[20–40] m 
[40–60] m 
[60–80] m 
[80–100] m 
[100–400] m 
[400–700] m 
[700–1,000] m 
[1,000–2,000] m (Reference level) 
 
Price 
 
RWF 300/m
3
 
RWF 1,000/m
3
 
Assumed linear (Not coded) 
Irrigation water   
   
Water availability 
 
5 months 
6 months 
 
[0–1] month (Reference level) 
[1–2] months 
[2–3] months 
[3–4] months 
[4–5] months 
[5–6] months 
[6–7] months 
   
Watering frequency 
 
6 watering events/month 
8 watering events/month 
 
0 watering events/month (Reference level) 
[0–2] watering events/month 
[2–4] watering events/month 
[4–6] watering events/month 
[6–8] watering events/month 
[8–10] watering events/month 
 
Semi-volumetric 
water pricing  
RWF 500/ha/watering 
RWF 1,000/ha/watering 
Assumed linear (Not coded) 
Source: Author’s data collection 
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 Table 2 Respondents’ SQ, 2012 
Variable Description Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Domestic water      
Piped water = 1 if respondent connected to 
piped water, 0 otherwise 
0.01 
 
0 1 
Distance Average distance (m) to non-
tap sources 
922.19 604.10 401 3,000 
Price (non-tap) Unit cost (RWF/m
3
) of non-tap 
water 
281.71 433.40 0 1,500 
Health effect Number of diarrhoeal 
infections per household 
member per year 
2.76 1.024 0 6 
Irrigation      
Price 
(irrigation) 
Cost for irrigation (RWF) per 
year 
855.15 1,250.78 0 4,620 
 
Irrigation 
frequency 
Irrigation frequency per month 
2.43 1.235 0 6 
Water 
availability 
Water availability in dry 
season (number of months) 
1.84 0.455 0 3 
Number of 
observations 
1,017     
Source: Author’s data collection 
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 Table 3 Mean, median and mode of attributes 
Variable 
Domestic 
water 
  
Irrigation 
water 
  
 Distance Health Price 
Irrigation 
frequency 
Water 
availability 
Semi-
volumetric 
price 
Mean 922.19 2.8 281.71 2.4 1.8 855.14 
Median 701 3 0 2.4 3 0 
Mode 700 3 0 2.5 2 0 
Source: Author’s data collection 
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 Table 4 Descriptive statistics: Domestic water and irrigation water 
Variable Description Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Age Respondent’s age 40.138 12.340 19 79 
Male =1 if respondent is male, 
0 otherwise 
0.499  0 1 
Children <5 =1 if household has children 
under 5 years, 0 otherwise  
0.507  0 1 
Education  =1 if the respondent has studied, 
0 otherwise  
0.692  0 1 
Years schooling Years of schooling 3.903 3.188 0 15 
WUA If the household is a member 
of the Water Users’ Association  
0.126  0 1 
Income Household’s monthly total income 17,185 18,994.98 300 88,000 
Household size The size of the household 4.907 2.014 0 13 
Status quo 
domestic  
=1 if the respondent chose the 
status quo alternative for domestic 
water use, 0 otherwise  
0.09  0 1 
Status quo 
irrigation  
=1 if the respondent chose the 
status quo alternative for irrigation 
water use, 0 otherwise  
0.255  0 1 
Source: Author’s data collection 
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 Table 5 Logistic regression of factors affecting choice of SQ 
Variable Water for domestic 
use 
Standard 
error 
Water for irrigation  Standard 
error 
Household size -0.031 0.022 -0.042* 0.023 
Age  0.009*** 0.004 0.006 0.004 
Education -0.343*** 0.164 -0.260** 0.116 
Male  0.220** 0.087 0.1820* 0.103 
Income -0.00001*** 0.00001 -0.00007** 0.000006 
WUA member   0.406*** 0.101 
Constant -2.696*** 0.199 -1.561*** 0.258 
Number of observations  7,065  Number of observations 2,088 
***,** and * = significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
Source: Author’s data collection 
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 Table 6 Model estimates for domestic water 
Water for domestic use     
 Conditional logit 
without SQ 
information 
RPL without SQ 
information 
RPL with SQ  RPL with SQ 
interaction 
Variable Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Water characteristics     
 Reduced distance
22
 0.03 0.03* 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.001) (0.001) 
Health effect 0.105* 0.108** 0.178*** 0.176*** 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.024) (0.024) 
Price -0.0003** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003 ***  
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.001) (0.0008) 
Distance*Education    0.023*  
    (0.014) 
Health*Education    0.007* 
    (0.043) 
Household characteristics     
     
ASC*Household size -0.324 -0.353*   
 (0.253) (0.360)   
ASC*Age of respondent -0.026* -0.032**   
 (0.043) (0.073)   
ASC*Education 0.099 0.203*   
 (0.084) (0.140)   
ASC*Male -0.364 -0.327*   
 (0.339) (0.292)   
ASC*Income 0.00001* 0.00002*   
 (0.00001) (0.00001)   
Intercept 0.209 0.268 *    
 (0.163) (0.167)    
Standard deviation     
Distance  0.01* 
(0.08) 
0.01**  0.06** 
Health effect  0.168 * 0.195**  0.0103** 
  (0.104)   
                                                     
22
 From Far (more than 1 km) to Near (20 m or less). 
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 Water for domestic use     
 Conditional logit 
without SQ 
information 
RPL without SQ 
information 
RPL with SQ  RPL with SQ 
interaction 
Variable Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Log-likelihood = 
Number of respondents 
Number of observations 
-1750.805 
702 
6,319 
-1749.267  -1753.286  
785 
7,065  
 
***,** and * = significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
Source: Author’s data collection 
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 Table 7 Model estimates for irrigation water 
Water for irrigation     
 Conditional logit 
without SQ 
information 
RPL without SQ 
information 
RPL with  SQ  RPL SQ with  
interaction 
Variable Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Water characteristics     
Water availability 0.324** 0.337** 0.482*** 0.824*** 
 (0.181) (0.132) (0.088) (0.097) 
Watering frequency 0.02 0.075* 0.119**  0.312*** 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.071) (0.090) 
Price -0.002** -0.001*** -0.0007***  -0.0002** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Water frequency*Education    0.283* 
    (0.186) 
Watering frequency*WUA 
member 
   -0.071** 
    (0.042) 
Household characteristics     
     
ASC*Age of respondent -0.214 -0.220*   
 (0.133) (0.135)   
ASC*Education 0.141** 0.185**   
 (0.592) (0.609)   
ASC*Male -0.438 -0.499   
 (0.381)  (0.417)   
ASC*WUA member -0.002 -0.005*   
 (0.112) (0.132)   
ASC*Income 0.00006 0.00007*   
 (0.00004) (0.00006)   
Intercept 0.285** 0.373**   
 (0.122) (0.191)   
Standard deviation     
Water availability   0.129** 
(0.028) 
0.011** 0.009** 
Watering frequency  0.074* 
(0.02) 
0.005* 0.11** 
Log-likelihood = -643.5253   232 -630.3350 -630.8271  
Number of respondents 232 171 
28
 Water for irrigation     
 Conditional logit 
without SQ 
information 
RPL without SQ 
information 
RPL with  SQ  RPL SQ with  
interaction 
Variable Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Water characteristics     
Number of observations 2,088 1,545 
***,** and * = significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
Source: Author’s data collection 
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 Table 8 MWTP for levels in domestic water 
 RPL without 
individual SQ 
information 
RPL with individual 
SQ information 
MWTP without 
individual SQ 
information as % 
of total income 
MWTP with 
individual SQ 
information as % 
of total income  
Variable Coefficient Coefficient   
Long-run health 
effect 
331.346*  678.085***  1.93% 3.95% 
Reduced  distance   99.554*  186.247***  0.58% 1.08% 
***,** and * significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
Source: Author’s data collection 
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 Table 9 MWTP for levels in irrigation water 
 RPL without 
individual SQ 
information 
RPL with individual 
SQ information 
MWTP without 
individual SQ 
information as % 
of total income 
MWTP with 
individual SQ 
information as % 
of total income  
Variable  Coefficient   
Water availability 195.42***  729.007*** 1.14% 4.24% 
Watering 
frequency 
 43.475*   181.193 **  0.25% 1.05% 
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 Appendix A: Experiment
23
 
 
1. Drinking water 
 
For ten years, the Government of Rwanda committed itself to develop the rural water sector and to 
bring water to all. To achieve this goal, the Government decided to give more power to districts 
through decentralisation and give priority to public–private partnerships for the management of 
running water systems. However, as you might be aware, the district still faces a huge problem of 
enough and safe water, which has hindered you from developing in many aspects. In fact, we all know 
that, for example, diarrhoeal disease is among the causes of death for children under 5 years old. 
Unsafe water and poor hygiene are major contributors to the prevalence of diarrhoea. The more 
vulnerable people are those who use unsafe valley dams as their main supply of water. 
 
Assuming the system is improved, water would be safe to drink; the risk of disease would be reduced; 
the high cost related to provision from different coping sources would be decreased; the hauling time 
would be reduced; etc. 
 
(NB: Here the enumerator will go through all attributes and explain them briefly.) 
 
                                                     
23
 The script was translated from Kinyarwanda. 
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 Assuming that the following two new sources of water were available in addition to your usual 
sources of water, which one would you prefer if you could choose? 
 
Example of choice set 
Attributes Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Neither 
Long-run health effect 0 cases of diarrhoeal 
infections per house 
member per year 
2 cases of diarrhoeal 
infections per house 
member per year 
Neither alternative 1 
or alternative 2: I 
will fetch water from 
my usual source Distance  20 m 40 m 
Price RWF 300/m
3  
(1 m
3 
= 50 jerrycans)
 
RWF 20 per jerrycan
 
Check only one box: 
 
  
Prefer alternative 1   
Prefer alternative 2   
Prefer existing source   
 
Debriefing questions 
 
Respondents who broke off the choice questions: 
1. What are the reasons you did not want to continue? 
0 Don’t know 
1 Situations were too unrealistic 
2 Too many questions 
3 Other (specify): 
 
Respondents who answered “Existing source” at least once: 
2. What are the reasons you preferred your existing situation in one/several of the choices? 
1 Too poor to pay any water fee 
2 Water should be free of charge 
3 We have alternatives to tap, dug well or rainfall dam water  
4 The water tariff is unrealistic 
5 Other (specify): 
 
Respondents who completed all choice questions: 
3. Which characteristics of the situations were the most important to you when choosing? 
Important Characteristic Most important 
Yes No Health and safety  
Yes No Distance to water  
Yes No Price  
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 2. Irrigation water 
 
Rwanda relies heavily on agriculture for its employment opportunities and the economic well-being of 
its people. Close to 90% of the population of Rwanda lives in rural areas. Achieving food security and 
increasing rural incomes will depend on increased productivity in this sector. Irrigation is, therefore, 
seen to be among the key instruments to raise agricultural productivity. By the way), assuming all 
benefitting farmers fully participate in the rational management of water infrastructure for irrigation 
purposes, your activities will provide the highest quality product that will generate more income to 
you. 
 
(NB: Here the enumerator will go through all attributes and explain them briefly.) 
 
Attributes and attribute levels for irrigation water 
Attributes Description Hypothetical attribute levels Existing level 
(specify) Alternative 1 Alternative 2 
Water 
availability  
During the dry season, you only get 
water for 1 month. With the new 
system, water availability will be 
high 
5 months 6 months … months 
Watering 
frequency 
You normally water your crops 
once per month due to insufficient 
water. With the current improved 
system, you will get enough water 
to water your crops. 
6 watering 
events per 
month 
8 watering 
events per 
month 
… 
watering 
events per 
month  
Price/cost The prices actually paid are 
inadequate and hamper rational 
water management. The improved 
service requires a price reform.  
RWF. 
500/acre/water
ing event 
RWF 
1,000/acre/ 
watering event 
… RWF per 
watering event 
 
Questions for each choice set 
For enumerators only: The blocks are to be presented to households systematically on a rotational 
basis so that each household interviewed sees only one of the blocks. 
All choices have a code which allows you to double-check which block they are in, i.e. 1-1-1 means 
the respondent chose Block 1, Choice 1, Alternative 1. 
NB: Enumerators will now present the choice sets to the respondent and wait for their responses. If 
the respondent is unable to read and write, the enumerator will help and guide him/her. 
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 Assuming that the following two new sources of water were available in addition to your usual 
sources of water, which one would you prefer if you could choose? 
 
Example of choice set 
Attributes Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Neither 
Water availability  5 months 5 months Neither alternative 
1 or alternative 2: I 
will irrigate as I do 
now Watering frequency 8 watering events per 
month 
6 watering events per 
month 
Volumetric water 
pricing 
RWF 1,000/acre/watering 
event 
RWF 500/acre/watering 
event 
 
Check only one box: 
 
  
Prefer alternative 1   
Prefer alternative 2   
Prefer existing practice   
 
Debriefing questions 
 
Respondents who broke off the choice questions: 
1. What are the reasons you did not want to continue? 
0 Don’t know 
1 Situations were too unrealistic 
2 Too many questions 
3 Other (specify): 
 
Respondents who answered “Existing practice” at least once: 
2. What are the reasons you preferred your existing situation in one/several of the choices? 
1 Too poor to pay a water fee 
2 Irrigation water should be free / low charge for farmers 
3 We have alternatives to the suggested system  
4 The volumetric water tariff is unrealistic 
5 Other (specify): 
 
Respondents who completed all choice questions: 
3. Which characteristics of the situations were most important to you when choosing? 
Important Characteristic Most important 
Yes No 1. Months of water in the irrigation zone  
Yes No 2. Watering frequency  
Yes No 3. Price per watering event  
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 Appendix B: Normal and log-normal distributions 
 
For the log-normal specification, we denote from model equation (9) an element   of    that disposes 
a log-normal distribution. The coefficient becomes – 
 
        (            ) (15) 
 
where     is an independent standard normal deviation. 
 
The parameters           represent the mean and the standard deviation of    (   ) to be estimated. 
 
The median, mean, and standard deviation of     are then – 
 
    (  )     (   
  
 
 
⁄ )         (   
  
 
 
⁄ )  [   (  
 )   ]    (16) 
 
The coefficient for the log-normal derived in equation (15) helped obtaining the mean and the median 
for the log-normally distributed coefficients. To interpret coefficients, we used the marginal rate of 
substitution between attributes by using the price coefficient as numeraire; the ratios would then be 
interpreted as the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for a change in the attribute (Hanemann 
1984).
1
 Table 10 shows that the results are almost similar for the normal and log-normal distributions 
in respect of domestic water, but that the mean coefficient and MWTP for watering frequency in 
irrigation are much higher in the log-normal case. This is a common finding, given that many studies 
reveal that the log-normal distribution registers a higher mean MWTP than other distributions. 
 
  
                                                     
1
 The interpretation of coefficents is not straightforward, except for significance and relative size. 
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 Table 10: Normal and log-normal distribution  
 Domestic 
water 
     
 Normal 
distribution 
 Log-
normal 
distribution  
   
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
Coefficient Standard 
error 
Mean Standard 
error 
Price -0.0003*** 0.001 -0.0002*** 0.0007   
Reduced distance 0.06*** 0.001 -3.550***  0.481  0.08**  0.004  
Health effect 0.178***  0.024  -1.919***  0.347  0.195***  0.05  
Standard deviations       
Distance 0.01**  0.01 0.482** 0.83   
Health effect 0.195** 0.09 0.642** 0.564   
MWTP Mean Standard 
error 
Mean Standard 
error 
Median Standard 
error 
Distance 166.567** 55.803 250.215** 83.625 86.882** 36.283 
Health effect 668.408***  225.441  682.35***  281.518  654.668*** 236.2129 
 Irrigation 
water 
     
 Normal 
distribution 
 Log-
normal 
distribution  
   
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
Coefficient Standard 
error 
Mean Standard 
error 
Price -0.0007*** 0.0001 -0.0007*** 0.0001   
Water availability 0.482*** 0.088 -0.733*** 0.179 0.486*** 0.096 
Watering frequency 0.119** 0.071 -0.118** 0.066 0.887*** 0.058 
Standard deviations       
Water availability 0.010** 0.030 0.080** 0.248   
Watering frequency 0.005* 0.033 0.006* 0.091   
MWTP Mean Standard 
error 
Mean Standard 
error 
Median Standard 
error 
Water availability 727.741*** 151.798 729.838**
* 
168.630 727.694*** 148.517 
Watering frequency 179.797** 111.798 1344.878*
** 
225.110 1344.850 225.110 
***,** and * = significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
Source: Author’s data collection 
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Abstract 
 
In this paper we describe a public good experiment carried out in 20 rural villages in Rwanda. We find 
that contributions in different parts of the country are affected by the local intensity of the 1994 
genocide, with more generous contributions being made in areas where violence was greater. This 
supports earlier research indicating that conflict experience leads to greater prosociality. However, we 
also find that people who have not been targets of violence themselves give lower contributions than 
people who have been. The considerable group-related and regional differences in social behaviour 
may have implications for the country’s ongoing decentralisation policies and for the country’s social 
cohesion in general. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we study social cohesion in Rwanda by way of a public good experiment. We explore 
whether a participant’s contribution to the public good is affected by his/her personal history and/or by 
local history. We find that these effects are indeed in evidence, and that there are substantial 
differences between the average contributions made by members of different groups. Earlier literature 
(Voors et al. 2012) has found that previous experience of violence can lead to increased prosocial 
behaviour; we find that this effect varies depending on whether one was the target of that violence or 
not. 
 
There is ongoing decentralisation in Rwanda of the provision of various public goods. Decentralisation 
will demand a sense of community spirit from the local populations, which will be tasked with 
maintaining these goods; more generally, a sense of community spirit and a sense of responsibility for 
the well-being of the community as a whole are crucial for a functioning society. Thus, the fact that 
there are such pronounced differences in prosocial behaviour, depending on what group one belongs 
to, is worrying. 
 
Rwanda has a long history of ethnic tensions. During the colonial era, the inhabitants of what is now 
Rwanda were subjected to differential treatment based on their classification as Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa, 
respectively; these categories had been based on social class before the colonial era, and 
reclassification due to social mobility was common, but the distinctions were perceived by the colonial 
rulers – first the Germans and then the Belgians – as immutable ethnic categories. Furthermore, the 
colonisers regarded the Tutsis as superior to the other two groups, and gave them preferential 
treatment. As a result, the Hutus rebelled in 1959. After Rwanda’s independence from Belgium in 
1961, the new government was dominated by Hutus, and ethnic violence continued. Some 700,000 
Tutsis left the country between 1959 and 1990, mostly becoming refugees in neighbouring countries. 
This diaspora served as the core of a rebel group that came to be known as the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF), which fought the national government occasionally in the early 1990s. In 1994, the Tutsi 
genocide caused the death of between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Tutsis (estimates vary widely, with 
800,000 being the most widely cited number), and led to a civil war which the RPF won. The RPF 
entered the capital, Kigali, in July 1994. Shortly after the new government had been installed, some 
700,000 former international refugees were able to return to the country. Apart from these refugees, 
Rwanda also had numerous internally displaced persons who had fled from the ongoing massacres to 
rebel-controlled areas; very few of the Tutsis who stayed in their original places of origin survived the 
genocide. 
 
There has since been relative peace within the country as well as considerable economic progress: 
growth rates have been among the highest in Africa, at over six per cent per year from 2000 onwards, 
and with per capita growth rates of over four per cent per year. All discussion of ethnicity has been 
banned, and ethnic groups can now only be referred to in the context of pre-1994 history. However, 
there is some evidence that tensions remain, and that people continue to perceive each other in the 
light of the pre-1994 divisions. 
 
Positive developments in the post-1994 period include a revamping of the public sector; anti-
corruption campaigns and performance-based financing policies that have largely been successful; and 
Rwanda’s regular ranking by e.g. Transparency International as one of the countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa with the least corruption and best public sector service delivery. Furthermore, decentralisation 
policies are currently being carried out or are being planned for various utilities and common property 
resources – notably, for example, the supply of water. 
 
Given that these public utilities work relatively well at present, at least by regional standards, the 
tensions that remain could potentially detract from the success of these decentralisation policies. 
Experiences from other countries with perceived or actual ethnic subdivisions indicate that such 
divisions can have adverse impacts on the provision of public goods (see e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara 
2000; Easterly 2001; Okten and Osili 2004; Habyarimana et al. 2007; Fong and Luttmer 2011). 
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Possible reasons for this include (1) differences in language and culture leading to different 
preferences; (2) coordination problems owing to distrust; and (3) reduced utility from public goods if 
people from the ‘wrong’ group also use them. The first reason is unlikely to be a problem in Rwanda, 
where people share a common culture and language. However, the other two reasons could 
conceivably be issues in Rwanda as well. Since all the Rwandan decentralisation policies have been 
implemented relatively recently or are still in the planning stage, it is difficult to assess their success 
directly as yet. In order to study the issue, therefore, we conducted an economic experiment where we 
attempted to simulate the problem of managing a common property resource such as a rural water 
pump. 
 
Experimental economics has been used in a few previous studies on ethnic fragmentation and conflict. 
In the study most reminiscent of ours in set-up and topic, Voors et al. (2012) used field experiments to 
study the effects of civil war in neighbouring Burundi and found that the experience of prior violence 
led people to become more generous to other participants, as well as more risk-seeking and more 
impatient. If these findings applied to Rwanda as well, one might actually expect public good 
provision to work better as a result of the previous conflict experience – at least if the increase in 
prosocial behaviour is large enough to offset the impact of the higher discount rates. 
 
However, although the civil war in Burundi was caused by the same ethnic conflict as that in Rwanda, 
the conflict experience was substantially different. Burundi experienced several years of civil war, 
where violence was widespread on both sides and where the level of conflict intensity was affected by 
the distance to the capital, but not by other factors. Thus, in the Voors et al. (2012) study, participants 
from a specific location in Burundi were equally likely to have been the targets of violence, regardless 
of the group to which they belonged (or to which they were perceived to belong). 
 
Rwanda, on the other hand, experienced one episode of armed conflict in the late 1950s, followed by a 
protracted period of relatively one-sided violence, and then a brief period of extremely intense 
violence – also largely one-sided – in 1994. Thus, the Rwandans in our experiment can be subdivided 
into different groups, based on the nature of their previous experience of violence. People who have 
lived in the same place as permanent residents all their lives will have experienced violence in 1994, 
but will not themselves have been the targets of that violence. Former internal refugees were targets 
of the 1994 genocide, and escaped being killed only by fleeing their homes. Former international 
refugees were targets of the earlier, lower-intensity, violence, but had left the country before 1994; so 
although almost all of them lost relatives in the genocide, they were not themselves the targets. In 
some cases, these international refugees had settled in Burundi or the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), where they continued to be exposed to violence; in some cases they settled in Tanzania or 
Uganda, where they were safe from violence. Unlike the Voors et al. (2012) study, therefore, we can 
differentiate not only between different levels of conflict intensity, but also between different forms of 
conflict experience, and between people who were the targets of violence and those who were not. 
 
2. Experimental design and procedure 
 
2.1 Experimental design 
 
In order to keep the experimental set-up as simple as possible, we followed a standardised set-up from 
experimental economics – a public good experiment. In such an experiment, a group of subjects is 
assembled, each receiving an endowment e. Each subject then decides how much of this endowment 
to keep and how much to donate to a ‘public good’ (hence the name, although the problem also has 
similarities to that of managing a common resource such as a water pump). The group’s total donation 
to the public good is then multiplied by a preannounced factor f which is greater than 1, but less than 
the number of participants, and the resulting, larger amount is then shared equally among the group 
members. 
 
The pay-off for an individual participant i is given by – 
 
3
  
 



N
k
kii cMPCRceP
1  (1) 
 
where ci is individual i’s contribution to the public good, MPCR (= f / N) is the marginal per capita 
return from a contribution to the public good, and N is the number of members in the group. The pay-
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Thus, since f > 1, the group as a whole will always gain from additional donations to the public good. 
Since f / N < 1, the individual participant will invariably lose from donating to the public good, and 
will primarily contribute to the public good from a sense of obligation to do so, e.g. either because s/he 
believes that others will also contribute, or because s/he feels responsible for the group’s well-being. 
Exploring what factors determine ci can, therefore, help identify levels of trust and the determinants of 
feelings of obligation. 
 
2.2 Experimental procedure 
 
The experiment was run in 20 different rural locations
1
 during February and March 2011, with 15 
people selected in each location. The selection process entailed that, in each location, people visiting 
the local market – which typically has a catchment population of some 5,000 to 10,000 people – were 
asked if they wished to participate in an economic experiment where they would get an sign-up reward 
of RWF 1,000 (corresponding to some four hours’ average pay) simply for participating, but where 
they would also have the opportunity to earn additional money. 
 
Each group of 15 participants was then assembled in a classroom, and were asked to fill out a short 
questionnaire about their personal characteristics, including their personal histories. We did not ask 
them about their perceived ethnic group, since any discussion of ethnic groups is now illegal in 
Rwanda. However, we did ask about their personal histories, and thus captured any former refugee 
status and conflict experience, as described in the introduction. The experiment was explained, 
including a brief description of how this linked to the ongoing decentralisation process in the country. 
After the set-up of the experiment had been explained, it was run in six rounds in all the various 
locations.
2
 In each of the six rounds, every participant was given an initial endowment of RWF 250. 
Groups of five were then selected at random from among the 15. No information was provided to 
individual participants on who else was in their five-member subgroup. MPCRs of 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 
were randomly allocated among the three groups. Thus, participants could judge how much the group 
as a whole would benefit from their contribution, but – since they only knew what the 15-person group 
as a whole looked like – they did not know who the specific beneficiaries within the larger group 
would be, or what the individual characteristics of the other four members of the group were. After 
each round, participants were told how much the other members of the five-person group had 
contributed to the public good in total, and how much they had received in total from that 
experimental round. After that, the next round was run. The entire experiment lasted from two to three 
                                                     
1
 Rwanda has four rural provinces. We selected five districts at random in each of these four. However, 
the Northern Province only has five districts, all of which we used. We then selected a rural market at 
random in each of the selected districts. 
2
 The main reasons for running several rounds in each location were to generate more data for the 
analysis, and to explore if there were any learning effects linked to initial uncertainty among 
participants about how the experiment worked. Separate regressions were run for the initial round only, 
and although they are not displayed here, the results were qualitatively similar to those shown for the 
entire data set in section 4, “Results”. The average contribution remained largely unchanged throughout 
all six rounds. 
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hours in each location, after which the participants received their earnings from the experiment. The 
average earnings from the experiment (including the sign-up fee) were some RWF 4,000 per 
participant, corresponding to two days’ average pay for less than three hours’ work, so it is reasonable 
to assume that the participants took the experiment seriously. The average contribution was 
approximately 50% of the initial endowment, similar to that seen in many other public good 
experiments (Levitt and List 2007). 
 
3. Empirical model 
 
Determinants of contributions to the public good were examined using random effects at the individual 
level. We included all the background variables collected through our questionnaire (age, gender, 
years of education, income, and the number of children) in all specifications. The MPCR might be 
expected to matter for the individual’s contribution to the public good: the individual participant will 
always lose from contributing more, but will lose less the higher the MPCR is; so individuals with low 
prosociality might nonetheless choose to contribute more when the MPCR is higher. In addition, since 
the experiment was run in several rounds, it is likely that experience from previous rounds might 
matter; we deal with this by including the return from the public good in the previous round of the 
experiment. Thus, we include both these variables, but for robustness we also check what happens 
when the previous round’s return is excluded. 
 
Notably, however, experience of previous conflict might matter for people’s sense of responsibility 
and/or generosity towards the rest of the group. Therefore, we try – 
 one set of specifications where previous status as a refugee is included as an explanatory 
variable 
 one where former refugees are subdivided further into (a) former international refugees, and 
(b) former internal refugees, and 
 one where the former international refugees are subdivided further into former refugees to 
Burundi or the DRC, and former refugees to Tanzania or Uganda.  
 
Former international refugees would have fled from pre-1994 violence and lived outside the country 
during the genocide, experiencing lower-intensity violence in Burundi or the DRC, but avoiding it in 
Tanzania or Uganda, while former internal refugees would have lived through the genocide but 
survived. In line with Voors et al. (2012), who include the share of the local population killed during 
the civil war, we also include the share of the local population killed during the genocide as an 
explanatory variable. 
 
4. Results 
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
Descriptive statistics for the entire experiment population are shown in Table 1. The average age of 
our participants was some 36 years. The average length of schooling was approximately nine years. A 
total of 60% of the participants were permanent residents who had lived in the area all their lives, 
while 40% were former refugees. Of the latter group, approximately 70% were former internal 
refugees, and 30% former international refugees, with the former international refuges coming in 
roughly equal numbers from Burundi and the DRC, on the one hand, and Tanzania and Uganda on the 
other. Former refugees are, on average, better educated and have higher incomes than permanent 
residents, although the differences are not statistically significant. 
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
Results from the estimated regressions are presented in Table 2. The MPCR is statistically significant 
in some of the specifications, but not when the rate of return from the previous round is included. The 
return in the previous round is statistically significant in all specifications where it is included. None 
of the background variables are statistically significant in any of the specifications. 
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However, more importantly, we find that the participants’ personal history matters, as does the local 
history in the area. If the group is only subdivided into former refugees and permanent residents, 
former refugees contributed an average of some RWF 12 to RWF 15 more in each round in 
comparison with permanent residents. These higher average contributions from former refugees are 
primarily from former international refugees. For former internal refugees, the average contribution is 
also higher than that for permanent residents, but is not significant in all specifications and is lower 
than the contributions from former international refugees, which are statistically significant in all 
specifications. When the participants are subdivided further, we find that former international refugees 
to Tanzania and Uganda have the highest average contributions, former refugees to Burundi and the 
DRC have lower contributions, former internal refugees have lower contributions still, and permanent 
residents have the lowest contributions; however, the differences are in some cases not statistically 
significant.  
 
The results for other variables are largely similar in all specifications when we include the share of 
people killed locally in the 1994 genocide. The effect of this variable is to increase the average 
contribution; this effect is statistically significant in all specifications. The share of people killed 
locally ranges from 1.4% to 69%; the estimated impact of this difference is to change the contribution 
by some RWF 40 to RWF 50, about a third of the average contribution and far more than the effect of 
any of the dummy variables included in the regressions. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
In this study, we ran a traditional public good experiment in six rounds in 20 different rural locations 
in Rwanda. In line with the findings in Voors et al. (2012), we find that local experience of violence 
matters: contributions in different parts of the country are affected by the local intensity of the 1994 
genocide, with more generous contributions being made in areas where the violence was greater. 
However, we also find that people who were themselves the targets of violence give higher 
contributions than people who were not. Former refugees who were targeted in the violence are more 
generous than permanent residents who were not targeted, and it also appears that there may be 
additional differences among the former refugees depending on the type of violence to which they 
were subjected. It remains to be explored in future research whether these outcomes can be ascribed to 
the sense of responsibility felt for the group as a whole (due either to the degree of prosociality or of 
concern regarding future group strife), to beliefs about how other people will behave, or to some other 
cause. However, that the behavioural impacts are there seems clear: experience with previous violence 
matters – especially for those who were the targets, but also for those who were bystanders. 
 
These effects on prosocial behaviour may have implications for the decentralisation policies being 
carried out. The assumption underlying the implementation of these policies is that they will allow 
local communities to be better poised to identify their most important priorities, and that they will 
therefore feel a sense of responsibility for maintaining the public goods thus decentralised. However, 
whether the policies will work depends crucially on whether local populations actually feel that sense 
of responsibility for the well-being of the group as a whole. One obvious concern in Rwanda is that 
this sense of responsibility may be affected considerably by historical experiences that are difficult to 
overcome. Whether this is the case is difficult to explore directly, but the results of our experiment 
indicate that their influence can indeed be felt. This may also affect how people act in practice with 
respect to such decentralised public goods, and could be an important factor affecting the success of 
Rwanda’s decentralisation policies. 
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Abstract 
 
In Rwanda, access to water is seen as a significant constraint to development in both urban 
and rural areas. The government and foreign donors give priority to improving access to water 
for agricultural use. In this paper we study whether and, if so, to what extent profitability in 
livestock farming in the Nyagatare District is affected by the distance that cattle need to go in 
order to reach the nearest water point. Our findings suggest that this distance does not affect 
the profitability of livestock farming much, meaning that improved access to water is not a 
major constraint to livestock farming at present. Therefore, other water needs can be given 
greater weight. 
 
Keywords: livestock farming, revenue function, Rwanda, water economics  
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we study how the availability of water affects revenue from livestock farming in 
Rwanda. Specifically, we study how the distance to the nearest water point affects the revenue 
generated by livestock for farmers in the Nyagatare District in eastern Rwanda, in order to 
assess the value generated by establishing additional water points in the District. 
 
There are many competing demands on Rwandan water policy; there are different potential 
uses for the water itself, but also different ways in which funds for water infrastructure could 
be used. The overall availability of fresh water per capita per year is 638 m
3
; by comparison, 
the United Nations estimated minimum requirement per capita is 1,700 m
3
 per year, i.e. the 
average Rwandan receives under half of the annual minimum requirement. Thus, it is vital 
that Rwanda manages its water resources with great care. An even more important constraint, 
however, is the poor state of much of the country’s water supply infrastructure, which leads to 
high technical losses. 
 
In many countries, agriculture is one of the main consumers of water. Nonetheless, water 
policy and agricultural policy are frequently seen as completely separate issues. These 
separate approaches often lead to water being used wastefully in agriculture, but also towards 
creating a lack of water for other uses (see e.g. Lange 1998 for research on this aspect in 
Namibia). In Rwanda’s case, some 68% of the country’s current annual use of fresh water 
from rivers and lakes is estimated to be consumed by agriculture. Moreover, the provision of 
water for agriculture is an important use of investment funds for water infrastructure: land 
pressure is increasing, and improved water access in agriculture is seen as a way of improving 
productivity. However, given the severe overall constraints, both on water availability per se 
and on the available funds, the benefits of agricultural water supply for its recipients are worth 
exploring. 
 
2. Water use in the Nyagatare District 
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
The Nyagatare District is located in Rwanda’s Eastern Province (Figure 1). The entire District 
was part of the Akagera National Park until 1994, when the Park’s size was reduced and a 
portion of the area was opened up for human settlement. Many of those settling in the new 
District have been former refugees returning from neighbouring countries who have brought 
livestock with them. However, there are also some migrants from other parts of the country 
(Niyonzima 2009). The government initially gave land in the District to newcomers. With 
increased land scarcity, markets have developed for renting land as well as for purchasing it 
outright. Of the farmers interviewed for the dataset used in this study, over 80% reported 
having been given at least part of their current plot from the government; almost 30% had 
either purchased some of their land from another private landowner, and/or been given some 
of their land by relatives who had owned it previously. 
 
The importance of livestock development in Nyagatare can be attributed to the dedication of 
the bulk of the District to cattle when land was redistributed after the 1994 genocide. The 
existence of vast areas has facilitated the development of cattle breeding; in more densely 
populated farming areas in Rwanda, where land is scarcer, livestock farming is less 
widespread. Indeed, grazing is banned in most other parts of the country. The District has, 
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 therefore, become one of the country’s main livestock-producing areas, and supplies almost 
half of Rwanda’s milk. Government and numerous foreign donors have invested considerable 
amounts in infrastructure for processing both dairy and meat products (Rutamu 2008). 
 
However, access to water has been perceived as an important constraint to expanding 
livestock production in the District. The local, traditional livestock breeds can typically walk 
long distances every day for water and grazing. However, the modern, improved livestock 
varieties introduced into the Nyagatare District after 1994 yield more milk and meat than the 
traditional varieties, but are also more sensitive to walking long distances for water. Thus, 
rural development schemes have included investments in improved storage dams for 
rainwater, as well as dams supplied with pumped groundwater. The Livestock Infrastructure 
Support Programme (LISP) for 2011–2015 lists improved water supply first among its 
infrastructure targets for livestock farmers, and entails setting up over 70 new livestock 
watering points, with the investment costs in Nyagatare District budgeted at some 4 million 
USD for 2013. 
 
The funds devoted to these dams could have been spent on other rural development activities 
or on other water supply measures. For example, many District households still lack access to 
potable water and purchase their water from private vendors. Investment in domestic water 
supply in the District is less than US$3 million annually for the current planning period, so 
this is not a hypothetical trade-off: the funds spent annually on improved water infrastructure 
for livestock in Nyagatare are greater than those spent on improved water infrastructure for 
people. Apart from the trade-off in funding, there is also a more direct trade-off in terms of 
the water itself: some of the new water supply points use groundwater which could have been 
used as a source of drinking water. Thus, although increased water use for livestock may not 
translate directly into more scarce and more expensive water for households, it does have 
important indirect effects on the water scarcity facing households because of these trade-offs. 
 
Despite the importance of water, when given a choice, households in the Nyagatare District 
tend to settle on the top of hills, some distance from water points, rather than occupying the 
lower levels closer to the water. This is because lower-lying areas have commonly been prone 
to malaria and livestock diseases. Those households that have settled close to water are often 
relative latecomers to the District, and have been forced to settle in former common land 
areas. Such common land areas were previously located around water points, but are now 
disappearing due to the individualisation of land rights and increased overall pressure on the 
land. The water points themselves remain communal, with access open to all, but the land 
surrounding them is, thus, increasingly being privatised. 
 
The fact that livestock from many different herds assemble at the same water points increases 
the risk of disease contagion between herds, especially for those farmers whose livestock 
spend a large part of their time close to the water points. This means that establishing new 
water points is not necessarily a net positive for all farmers. A new water point will reduce the 
average number of livestock visiting each water point and, thus, reduce overall disease 
transmission. However, the number of livestock visiting the vicinity of the new water point 
will increase, and farmers who are near the new water source may well see their livestock 
becoming more susceptible to disease as a result. Thus, while the overall impact of improved 
water access on productivity should be positive because the overall exposure to disease is 
reduced, the individual farmer might experience reduced productivity if the changes in 
herding patterns lead to increased susceptibility to disease for that farmer’s herd. 
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 The clear priority given to expanding access to water for livestock, over e.g. water for 
domestic use, might be justified if it leads to dramatic increases in productivity. However, the 
two main channels through which productivity might improve are through reduced walking 
distances for cattle, which is only relevant for a fraction of the overall herds, and the reduced 
susceptibility to disease for those herds that are affected positively, which will be partly 
outweighed by increased susceptibility to disease for other herds. It is useful, therefore, to 
examine how much improved access to water actually contributes to profitability in the 
livestock industry. 
 
3. Materials and methods 
 
The data for this study come from a survey carried out in the Nyagatare District in 2006 as 
part of an earlier study by Niyonzima (2009). A total of 180 farmers were interviewed for the 
survey. Of these, 140 actively farmed livestock and are included in this data set; the remaining 
40 were crop farmers and are not included in our analysis. 
 
The variables included in the data set include the annual revenue from selling different types 
of livestock products such as meat, milk and live animals; the head of household’s gender, 
year of settlement, marital status, and years of education; the household size; the plot size; the 
size of the livestock herd; and the distance to the nearest water point. 
 
Over 80% of the heads of household interviewed are male. The average number of years they 
had spent in school is 2.3, so the average individual in the sample has not completed primary 
school. Over 70% of the respondents in the sample are married. The average number of 
persons in a household is approximately six. The size of the farmed plot varies considerably, 
ranging from 0.45 ha to 80 ha. All 140 interviewees settled in the area after 1994. The average 
distance to a water point is approximately 3 km, with the closest farmer only 50 m away, and 
the most distant farmer 7.5 km away. However, the data show that many farmers rounded off 
their answers to this question; for instance, some 31% stated that their cattle had to walk 
exactly 1 km in order to reach the nearest water point. 
 
A commonly used approach in economics to estimate the value of a free, but limited, input 
would be to estimate a profit function with the available quantity of the free input as one of 
the variables in the profit function (see e.g. Sadoulet and De Janvry 1995). However, as input 
prices are not available for the current study, we estimate a revenue function rather than a 
profit function, but using the same approach.
1
 
 
For simplicity, we have employed the widely applied Cobb-Douglas statistical specification 
(Cobb and Douglas 1928), using the following as explanatory variables: 
 Labour, measured using the number of household members as a proxy 
 Capital, measured as the value of the livestock herd, and 
 Land, measured as the area of the household’s plot. 
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  Despite being widely used in agricultural economics, as well as in other fields of economics, revenue 
functions can in fact be problematic if different farms have dramatically different types of production 
techniques (Daunfeldt and Rudholm 2009). However, as farming practices are largely similar throughout 
the area studied in this case, albeit with different endowments of land and livestock, the approach can 
safely be used here. 
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 In order to examine the impact of access to water, we estimate a separate regression where 
this variable, measured as the distance in kilometres to the nearest water point, is also 
included along with the other regressors. Since the improved productivity linked to shorter 
walking distances and the increased risk of disease transmission near water points might act in 
different directions, we also estimate a third regression, where possible nonlinear effects of 
the distance to water are included by using an additional quadratic distance-to-water term. 
Thus, the specifications estimated were as follows: 
 ln (revenue) = a0 + a1 ln (persons in household) + a2 ln (capital) + a3 ln (land) 
 ln (revenue) = b0 + b1 ln (persons in household) + b2 ln (capital) + b3 ln (land) + b4 ln 
(distance to water), and 
 ln (revenue) = c0 + c1 ln (persons in household) + c2 ln (capital) + c3 ln (land) + c4 ln 
(distance to water) + c5 (ln (distance to water))
2
. 
 
We also tried other specifications and combinations of variables, with largely similar results. 
 
4. Results 
 
The results from the statistical analysis are provided in Table 1. In all three specifications, we 
find that the coefficients are, jointly, statistically significantly different from 0 at a 0.1% level 
of significance. Distance to water, our main variable of interest, does not have a clear impact 
on revenue. In the linear specification, distance to water is not statistically significant at all 
(and has a positive sign). In the nonlinear specification, the linear term is positive and 
statistically significant, while the quadratic term is negative and significant. The sizes and 
signs of the coefficients suggest that revenue increases with increasing distance to water, but 
only up to a distance of some 2.7 km; it declines with greater distance. 
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
Access to labour does not appear to be a major constraint to farming: household labour is not 
statistically significant at the 5% level in either of the specifications used. Indeed, this is a 
frequent finding in densely populated farming areas. The size of the livestock herd matters for 
revenue, not surprisingly, and so does the size of the farmed plot. The results for these three 
variables are almost identical for the two specifications – and remain similar if the water 
access variables are dropped altogether. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we examined the impact of improved access to water on the profitability of 
livestock farming in the Nyagatare District in Rwanda. Donors and government agencies 
currently give priority to improved water availability for livestock; in Nyagatare, for example, 
which was the focus of our study, more money is currently being spent on improved water 
availability for livestock than on improved water availability for people. It is worthwhile, 
therefore, to examine how much difference improved water access actually makes. 
 
Our results do not provide convincing evidence that the distance to the nearest water point 
matters for livestock farming in the Nyagatare District, at least not with the distances that are 
currently relevant. Our results even suggest (at least in our nonlinear specification) that close 
proximity to water might be a net negative, which might be linked to the increased risk of the 
animals contracting diseases. One should perhaps not overemphasise this result, given that a 
fair number of the farmers rounded off their answers so that the exact distances are difficult to 
5
 ascertain for those farmers who are close to a water point. Nonetheless, these findings 
definitely do not show conclusively that being close to water is important for the profitability 
of livestock farming in the area. 
 
The funding currently being devoted to expanding access to water for livestock in the 
Nyagatare District could be used to improve access to domestic water for households in 
Nyagatare or elsewhere. Some of the water used for watering livestock also has alternative 
uses. Thus, the finding that extending access to water for livestock farmers in Nyagatare does 
not have a measurable impact on livestock productivity suggests that the current priorities in 
water policy should be reconsidered. 
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Table 1 Results of the statistical analysis 
Variable Coefficient 
Specification 
without distance 
to water 
Linear 
specification 
Nonlinear 
specification 
ln (Persons in household) 0.3004 
(0.1704) 
0.3071 
(0.1727) 
0.2132 
(0.1519) 
ln (Capital stock) 0.5373*** 
(0.0846) 
0.5404*** 
(0.0854) 
0.5604*** 
(0.0862) 
ln (Land size) 0.4285*** 
(0.0892) 
0.4130*** 
(0.0893) 
0.3913*** 
(0.0902) 
ln (Distance to water)  0.0574 
(0.1263) 
0.8741** 
(0.3281) 
(ln (Distance to water))
2
   -0.4421* 
(0.1782) 
Intercept 3.6690** 
(1.0348) 
3.5730** 
(1.0342) 
3.2461** 
(1.0494) 
R
2
 0.6923 0.6975 0.7072 
 F(3,132) = 127.22 F(4, 128) = 91.79 F(5, 127) = 83.12 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 5%, 1% and 0,1% significance levels, respectively 
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Paper V

Errata 
 
Stage, J. and C. Uwera (2012): Water management and pricing in the urban areas of Rwanda: the case 
of Kigali city. Water Utility Management International 7 (3):13-17. 
 
Page 14, Section2.  
 
1) 2nd paragraph, line 6: 
Change “5 m3 per year” to “5 m3 per month”. 
 
2) 2nd paragraph, line 8: 
Change “some two litres a day” to “some twenty seven litres a day”. 
 
Page 14, Table1.  
 
Change “0 m3 per year” to “0 m3 per month”. 
Change “5 m3 per year” to “5 m3 per month”. 
Change “20 m3 per year” to “20 m3 per month”. 
Change “50 m3 per year” to “50 m3 per month”. 
Change “100 m3 per year” to “100 m3 per month”. 
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WATER PRICING
The pricing of water has drawnthe attention of many econo-
mists. An important topic of
research has been how to ensure
efficiency, effectiveness and equity –
in allocation as well as management
– through the selection of suitable
policy instruments.Although no
single policy can serve as a guideline
for all situations, a few recommen-
dations can nonetheless be made
from the economics literature
for water pricing in developing
countries.
Economic theory suggests that an
efficient price structure is one that
encourages an efficient allocation of
resources in the economy via the signals
that it sends to consumers and producers.
If the price of a good does not reflect its
social marginal cost, i.e. the additional
cost to society of providing one more
unit of the good in question, consumers
do not receive appropriate information
about the social cost of a marginal
increase in demand.Thus, efficient prices
need to reflect marginal costs.As a conse-
quence, economists often recommend
the application of uniform rate tariffs for
water, set to reflect the marginal cost of
providing water.Regardless of whether
or not this is actually implemented,
consumers should at least face a price
corresponding to the marginal cost of
additional water provision when they
make decisions about their marginal
water use. In practice, an important
additional objective for most water
utilities (see e.g.Diakité et al., 2009) is
cost recovery: tariffs should be set so as to
generate revenue that will cover not only
at least the operating costs in the short-
term,but also, ideally, the long-term
investment costs.
However, concerns about distribution
are also important. In many developing
countries, full marginal cost pricing for all
water could have unacceptable impacts
on the poorer members of society.
Because of this, the use of increasing
block water tariffs is widespread in devel-
oping countries.An increasing block
tariff (IBT) is a price structure in which a
commodity is priced at a low initial rate
up to a specified volume of use (block),
then at a higher or several increasingly
higher rates for additional blocks used.
However, the use of IBTs by water
utilities has been criticised for several
reasons.
First of all, setting the size of the initial
block remains a challenge.An optimal
IBT from an economic perspective
would normally be a two-step tariff
where the first block is set below margin-
al cost, and is set such that relatively few
users terminate their consumption in this
block.This means that the provision of
cheap water would be limited to water
use which is crucial for all households.
However, it is politically complicated for
utilities to limit the size of the initial
block for residential users, due to pressure
from politicians and special interests
(Boland andWhittington,2000).As a
result, the revenue loss associated with the
first block – and,hence, the problems that
IBTs pose for the revenue generation
mentioned earlier – is an even greater
problem than it would otherwise be.
Another limitation is that the IBT is
normally not adjusted for the number of
consumers using a specific connection.
Secondly, and most fundamentally,poor
households are often not connected to
the water network at all and,hence do
not receive the subsidised service.As
discussed by Sterner (2002), the cost of
providing water services to an individual
consumer often entails large fixed costs
for distribution, connection,metering,
administration and control.Furthermore,
when the demand grows and exceeds the
supply capacity of the current system,
expensive new investments may be
necessary to provide the necessary supply.
Water management and pricing in the urban areas of
Rwanda: the case of Kigali city
Water tariffs ideally generate enough revenue to cover operation and maintenance costs, as well as long-
term investment, but in the case of Kigali in Rwanda the block tariff structure means people pay less than
cost recovery price for their water, and connection fees lead the poorest to source their water from
elsewhere, at a higher cost than the piped supply. JESPER STAGE and CLAUDINE UWERA discuss a study
undertaken into the current water pricing system and evaluate the potential for efficiency gains, and for
greater numbers to connect to a piped supply, by moving to other alternatives.
Field work done by SANO during October 2007. Credit: Jean Bosco Kanyesheja.
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Even when poor households have
connections, they use less water than
their richer counterparts, thus receiving
a smaller subsidy in absolute terms
(Whittington et al., 2009).
Whittington (1992) discusses this issue
in detail, arguing that IBTs can be
expected to affect poor households
negatively. IBT structures can only work
if each household (rich or poor) has a
metered private water connection.
However, a large proportion of house-
holds in many cities in developing coun-
tries occur in slums,where the cost of
living compels them to share expenses. In
these cases, poor households are less likely
to have individually metered connec-
tions, due to the connection cost itself,
and are obliged to obtain water either
through a shared connection or by pur-
chasing water from neighbours who have
such connections.Thus, if all households
in a building use the same water connec-
tion, and if an IBT is applied, their high
joint rate of use pushes the water bill for
the building as a whole into the higher-
priced blocks.The marginal price paid for
water increases, and so does the average
price paid.The household selling water
may have either metered or unmetered
connections.Metered connections are
often billed through an IBT structure,
while unmetered connections are billed
via a flat rate – regardless of the level of
consumption.A household that has an
unmetered water connection can sell
water to other households at essentially
zero marginal cost.Obviously,unmetered
connections can cause significant losses of
revenue to the water utility.On the other
hand, if household connections are
metered, the seller has to adjust the price
to the high IBT rate and indirectly tax
the buyer by increasing the price of the
water provided.As a consequence, the
poor – who are the most likely to lack
their own water connections and who are
obliged to purchase their water from
neighbours or commercial vendors –
often pay the most per unit for it.
In addition, the reduced revenue due to
the lower tariffs will lead the utility to
reduce or recoup costs elsewhere. If the
utility aims at full cost recovery, a frequent
outcome will be higher tariffs for estab-
lishing connections in the first place (see
e.g.Griffin and Mjelde,2011).This would
penalise newcomers to the city,who are
frequently among the poorer segments of
the population. If the utility is partly
subsidised by government, it will
nonetheless be pressurised to keep costs
down, and this often leads to limited
reinvestment and, in the longer term, to a
dilapidated distribution network.This
means that the benefits of providing
reliable access to safe water for all house-
holds – public health effects, time savings,
and so on – are frequently not realised.
Thus, the ideal tariff structure should
achieve several policy goals at once: cost
recovery; efficiency (marginal cost)
pricing for most or all users for marginal
water use; and socially acceptable distrib-
ution outcomes.Admittedly,doing all of
these at once is difficult, and few utilities
in developing countries have managed to
tackle them all simultaneously.
Water pricing and water use in the
urban areas of Rwanda
Urban households in Rwanda experience
many of the problems discussed above
firsthand.The country’s water supply
sector is divided into two subsectors,
which are separate entities: the urban
water supply system;and the rural water
supply system.Potable water in urban
areas is supplied by the state-owned
Energy,Water and SanitationAuthority
(EWSA, formerly Electrogaz).EWSA is
responsible for the provision and distribu-
tion of electricity and water, and has a
monopoly in both sectors.EWSA is a
semi-autonomous public company
with a Director General appointed by
the government.However,principal
decisions like investment,planning
and development budgets are taken at
ministry level.
EWSA maintains a joint IBT system
structure for all urban areas in the coun-
try, regardless of the cost of provision to
the individual urban area (Table 1).The
cut-off rate for the first block is set at
5m3 a year.For an average-sized house-
hold of six persons, therefore, a per capita
consumption of some two litres a day –
the minimum amount of potable water
required for survival – is covered by the
lowest rate.However, the cut-off rates and
tariffs for the subsequent tariff blocks are
set administratively, and are not closely
linked to the cost of water provision. In a
study a few years ago (Electrogaz,2006),
the average (not marginal) cost of water
provision was estimated at some 750
Rwandan Francs ($1.25) exclusive of
Hand pump use during fieldwork in 2011. Credit: Claudine Uwera.
Table 1: Tariff schedule in urban areas in Rwanda
Lower bound of tariff Upper bound of tariff Tariff level
(including 18% value added tax)
0m3 per year 5m3 per year RwF 283 ($0.47) per m3
5m3 per year 20m3 per year RwF 354 ($0.59) per additional cubic metre
20m3 per year 50m3 per year RwF 472 ($0.78) per additional cubic metre
50m3 per year 100m3 per year RwF 767 ($1.27) per additional cubic metre
100m3 per year No limit RwF 873 ($1.45) per additional cubic metre
Source: EWSA (2012)
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VAT;with inflation, it is likely to be
higher now.This means that all customers
pay less for their water – even their
marginal water use – than the cost of
providing that water to them.On the
other hand, the connection fee which
households pay to have a connection to
the network installed is based on the
actual cost associated with that particular
connection, and has to be paid before the
connection is installed.
No estimates exist for the long-term
costs including reinvestments and new
investments, but the overall revenue
collected by EWSA has long been insuffi-
cient to finance maintaining the existing
network – let alone expand water provi-
sion.Water management in Rwanda has,
therefore,been a great challenge for
policymakers.The difficulties are not
caused by water scarcity per se,but by the
problems associated with financing water
supply and treatment operations. It is
estimated that more than a third of the
country’s drinking water supply infra-
structure needs urgent rehabilitation
(Republic of Rwanda,2010).
The major issue in the water sector is in
distribution. It is estimated that approxi-
mately 15% of the water is lost because of
technical issues such as broken pipes,poor
maintenance and general breakdowns, as
the system is in disrepair.Another 15-
20%,depending on the area, is lost for
other,non-technical reasons.Of the non-
technical losses, 70% are related to fraud
and illegal connections. In addition, the
poor functioning of the electricity sector
plays a role in the water sector’s poor
performance, as the lack of reliable elec-
tricity to run the pumps and distribute
the water have caused the public to have
no access to water for long periods at a
time (USAID,2005).
Some two thirds of the urban residents
of Rwanda live in Kigali. In 2011, a
survey was conducted and 500 Kigali
residents interviewed on their water use.
Based on this survey, it can be concluded
that, despite the low marginal tariffs
facing most users currently connected to
the network, costs are an issue (Table 2).
Only 6.6% had a private connection to
their house,with an additional 40.6%
being connected via the plot in which
their house was located.Sizeable shares
reported that they could get a more direct
connection,but found the connection fee
too expensive, and relied on public taps or
other sources for their water. It may be
noted that the average income is substan-
tially higher in the first group than in the
other groups, and that the households
that get their water from the water
network – albeit not from a private tap –
pay a higher average cost per cubic metre
of water and use less water than the
households who have a private tap.1
Thus,despite the distributional consider-
ations built into the IBT system, the
overall distribution impact is regressive
when the effect of the high connection
fee is included.
Considering how much more expen-
sive the alternative water sources are,why
do respondents use them rather than pay
the one-off fee for connecting to the
distribution network through a private
connection?The survey respondents hint
at a reason in the question about time
preferences: the vast majority stated that
they preferred to receive RwF 100,000
($166) at once rather than RwF 200,000
($332) three months from now, suggest-
ing that many of the households in our
sample are highly constrained in their
access to liquidity.Thus, the considerable
future savings that would be generated by
a private connection are not enough to
justify the high short-term expense of
establishing the connection.
As in many cities in developing coun-
try, water provision in Kigali is uncertain
(Table 3).Of the 500 households in the
sample,only one stated that its members
experienced pre-announced water
outages and never unannounced ones.
Some 89% of the respondents in the
sample respond to these interruptions by
storing water when it is available –
putting additional pressure on the distrib-
ution network – and consuming the
stored water during supply interruptions
until water becomes available again.
However, those who are able to store
enough for the entire shortage are a
minority, and 83% report that they rely
on alternative suppliers for at least some
of their emergency supplies during water
shortages. Such alternatives include a
neighbour who has the capacity to store
water, a water kiosk, a water tanker,or a
mobile vendor.Those who are not able to
store water to meet their full needs
during a supply interruption are, again,
usually the poorest.As may be noted from
Table 3,many households report average
water costs that are higher than even the
highest of the rates in the IBT schedule,
reflecting their reliance on other,more
costly water sources.
Possible alternatives
Looking at the current water provision
situation in Kigali and the problems
currently facing water users and the main
WATER PRICING
Table 2: Access to water network
Access to Share of More direct Average household Per capita water Average water Average monthly
respondents (%) connection available, size consumption in cost per m3 income
but unaffordable (%) household per (RwF) (RwF)
month (m3)
Piped connection 6.6 Not applicable 5.4 8.14 905 324,200
into house ($1.5) ($538.5)
Piped connection to 40.6 27.4 5.6 4.25 1412 166,500
yard / plot, but not (1) ($2.35) ($276.6)
Public tap, but not 34.0 29.6 5.5 1.20 1549 187,200
(1) or (2) ($2.57) ($311)
Other protected water 14.4 12.0 5.3 0.26 628 143,900
(well, protected spring, ($1.04) ($239)
etc.) but not (1), (2) or (3)
Unprotected water only 4.4 4.4 5.6 0.034 205 261,100
($0.34) ($433.7)
Source: Authors’ survey, Kigali, Rwanda, 2011
water provider, two obvious issues arise
from an economic perspective.One is the
tariff levels in the IBT, the other is the
high connection fee.
The tariff levels are set sufficiently low
to ensure that all connected households –
who, again, tend to be middle- rather than
lower-class households – pay less than
what it costs to provide water to them,
even for their marginal water use.This
contributes heavily to a situation where
the water utility cannot afford to pay for
necessary maintenance, and where, as a
result, almost all water users suffer from
planned and unplanned water shortages. If
the quantity threshold for the first block
were kept at the current 5m3 per year but
all consumption above that level were
priced at marginal – or at least cost recov-
ery – rates, this would either reduce water
consumption, reducing the excess
demand in relation to capacity, increase
revenue,making more funds available for
maintenance and investment,or both.
Regardless of which of these outcomes
played out,water availability through the
network would improve.Notably, even
with such a price increase, the water over
the subsistence level would still cost less
than what most households currently pay
for emergency water.
Even more importantly, the high
connection fee deters users, but especially
the poor, from connecting to the water
network in the first place, and means that
most of the beneficiaries of the IBT
system are relatively well off.Given the
tight liquidity constraints that most of the
respondents faced, and their willingness to
pay high interest rates in the future for
increased consumption today, an obvious
alternative policy would be for them to
pay the connection fee in instalments on
the monthly water bill rather than pay it
in full in advance.An instalment scheme
could be set up where, after a connection
is established, the overall monthly cost
includes interest and a partial amortisation
of the connection cost, but such that the
monthly cost remains lower than the cost
of water purchased from private vendors.
This would still generate sufficient rev-
enue to pay off the water utility’s capital
cost for establishing the connection.
The exact repayment time would of
course depend both on the extra cost
imposed on households in order to pay
for the connection, and on how sensitive
the households are to reductions in the
cost of water.Presumably, a drastic reduc-
tion in the per-cubic-metre cost of water
would lead to increased water use,but the
exact increase is difficult to estimate a
priori.However, an extreme upper bound
to a household’s water use after such a
price reduction is the per capita water
use of the households that are already
connected, since they face an even lower
water price – having already paid their
connection fee – and have a higher
income.A lower bound is the household’s
current water use.Assuming arbitrarily
(Table 4) that an extra cost of 100% of the
IBT rate is added to the IBT rate for each
level, and that the connection fee is the
RwF 124,000 ($206) fee currently stated
as the estimated average cost of connec-
tion by unconnected households in the
sample,households that currently get
their water from nearby connections in
their plot or yard would repay their
connection fee in about 10 to 24 months,
depending on how much their water use
increases as a result of the price reduction.
Households that currently have a public
tap as their main water source would,
even if they do not increase their water
use at all, repay the connection cost over a
span of less than nine years. If their water
use did increase, as seems more likely,
repayment would be faster.
These simple numerical examples only
give rough indications of the economic
benefits of improved water services from
more efficient water pricing. In practice,
these benefits will depend on how
sensitive consumers are to the suggested
changes in pricing.However, there
appears to be scope for improving house-
holds’ overall welfare.We do not know
precisely how much households are
prepared to pay for an improved piped
network or for getting access to the
network in the first place,but we do
know how much they currently pay
for emergency water when the piped
network does not work; and we also
know that, aside from the private cost and
time savings generated by a more reliable
network, there would be important
public health improvements (see e.g.
Whittington et al., 2009).
Expanding the network and providing
more households with private connec-
tions and individual meters would be
unambiguously positive from a distribu-
tion perspective, as the unconnected
households are predominantly poor.
Higher tariffs are more complicated,but
given the current uncertainty in delivery,
if the additional revenue from a tariff
increase is used to improve security in
water provision,households should still be
better off as a result.
Conclusions
There is clearly imperfection in the
pricing mechanisms in water supply in
Rwanda.The current unreliable water
service is mainly due to the government’s
inability to finance capital costs for infra-
structure, which is in turn at least partly
due to the current mispricing of water.
For this reason,better pricing instruments
could help water management.Changing
the current tariff blocks could increase
revenue,making maintenance of the
network easier to finance, and could at
the same time reduce pressure on the
network by reducing demand.Similarly,
changing the way in which new connec-
tions are financed – letting households
pay in instalments rather than up front –
could make it easier for households
to connect to the water network in the
first place.
Residents in Kigali, the capital city and
main urban centre, suffer from water
delivery problems which are similar to
those in many other developing coun-
tries. Given the importance of water
access for household welfare and for
health, this poorly functioning water
delivery is an important social problem.
However, analysis suggests that relatively
small changes could improve the situation
considerably.
Note
The final group also included some
affluent households who had bottled
water as their main source of drinking
water.Despite the inclusion of these
affluent households, the average income
in this group is lower than in the first
group.
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Table 3: Reported frequency of interruptions
Once a month 22.9%
Once every two weeks 7.6%
Once a week 20.6%
Twice a week 25.6%
Three days a week or more 23.2%
Source: Authors’ survey, Kigali, Rwanda, 2011
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WATER PRICING
Table 4: Numerical example of the speed of recouping connection fee in instalments if a five-member household gets a
private tap connection and pays off the connection in instalments, using a 5% real interest rate, using the average
connection fee reported (RwF 124 000), and assuming that a surcharge of 100% is added to the IBT rate
User category Assumed monthly household use Total monthly water Current monthly Number of months until
cost until connection repaid water cost connection fee repaid
Households currently using plot 40.7m3 32,993 30,005 10
or yard connection (same as current private tap users) ($54.8) ($49.8)
21.25m3 14,868 30,005 21
(same monthly household use as now) ($24.7) (49.8)
Households currently using 40.7m3 32,993 9294 10
public tap (same as current private tap users) ($54.8) ($15.4)
14.1m3 9294 9294 34
(same monthly cost as now) ($15.4) ($15.4)
6.0m3 3540 9294 102
(same monthly household use as now) ($5.9) ($15.4)
Source: Authors’ calculations
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